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1
Introduction
William Kern
Western Michigan University

Throughout history mankind has been subject to disasters produced
by “Mother Nature” as well as the man-made variety. Only recently,
however, have economists understood disasters as economic phenomena to be formally analyzed. Given the magnitude of many recent
disasters, their impact on local, regional, and national economies, and
the coverage of their consequences in the popular press, it is puzzling
that the attention of economists was for so long largely diverted from
analysis of these events. Perhaps George Stigler has already provided
the answer to this puzzle in his Nobel lecture, where he observed that
economists have frequently neglected the study of important current
events. He points out, for example, that “during the Industrial Revolution, economists adopted the law of diminishing returns but ignored the
most widespread growth of output that the world had yet observed.”
The explanation that he offered, perhaps tongue in cheek, was that “the
scholars who create economic theory do not read the newspapers regularly or carefully during working hours” (1992, p. 61).
We are now observing, happily, a reversal of this practice, as more
economists have begun to study the economics of disasters during the
past several decades. Although the number of economists who study disasters is still small, the economics of disasters appears to be well on the
road to establishing itself as an important subdiscipline in economics.
Why are economists now more likely to pay attention to disasters?
As Howard C. Kunreuther and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan report in their
chapter, “Market and Government Failure in Insuring and Mitigating
Natural Catastrophes: How Long-Term Contracts Can Help,” disasters
were, for much of history, regarded as low-probability events. However, they argue that we are now entering “a new era of catastrophes”
in which disasters occur with greater frequency and the losses are of
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a much greater magnitude than in the past. Why are disasters occurring more frequently and why are the losses increasing? Kunreuther
and Michel-Kerjan offer several reasons for the greater magnitude and
greater frequency of disasters. One prominent change in recent decades
is a significant increase in the population concentrated in urban areas on
coasts, which puts more people at risk of losses due to hurricanes and
tsunamis. The greater level of economic development in coastal areas
has also increased the magnitude of losses. Kunreuther and MichelKerjan suggest that global climate change may be at work as well. They
point out that of the 20 biggest catastrophes occurring between 1970
and 2004, more than 80 percent were weather-related.
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan therefore suggest that the time has
come to develop a better strategy for coping with disasters. In their
opinion, the recent losses suffered in these catastrophic events suggest
that inadequate preparation and inadequate mitigation efforts have been
the norm. This, they argue, is due in large part to myopia and misperception of the actual risks, both by potential victims and policymakers.
What do they suggest should be done? Kunreuther and MichelKerjan offer several guiding principles designed to stimulate greater
mitigation efforts and minimize insurance losses while still offering
protection against catastrophe. The primary guiding principle is that
insurance should be priced in accordance with risk. They argue that
such pricing will create incentives to invest in mitigation efforts, citing
substantial evidence for the significant benefits of mitigation. Unfortunately, typical property owners will be unlikely to bear the high up-front
cost of mitigation efforts in light of the uncertainty of short-run cost
savings. Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan therefore argue for the development of long-term insurance contracts designed to induce property
owners to take a long-run view of the problem. However, they recognize that forces on both the supply side and the demand side militate
against the emergence of markets for this type of insurance contract.
They therefore suggest government action to help create such markets.
They argue that the National Flood Insurance Program might offer the
best opportunity to create long-term insurance markets and demonstrate
the usefulness of long-term insurance policies and thus encourage their
development.
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While Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan are able to demonstrate the
potential benefits of long-term insurance arrangements, doubt remains
regarding the political will to undertake what is necessary to make them
viable. As they point out, private long-term insurance contracts have
failed to emerge in part because of government policy. State government insurance regulators have, unfortunately, largely resisted efforts
by insurance companies to raise premiums to reflect risks. In fact, there
is increasing pressure on state insurance regulators in high-risk states
such as Florida to reduce insurance rates rather than increase them.
The general public often believes that insurance companies have made
enormous profits at their expense and that current insurance rates are
unnecessarily high due to the greed of insurance executives. It will be a
hard sell to convince the public, as well as politicians, who depend on
public support, of the necessity of raising rates to reflect risks. While
pricing insurance to reflect risks is good economics, such a strategy
would entail a high likelihood of loss for politicians who support it.
Anthony M. Yezer’s chapter, “Expectations and Unexpected Consequences of Public Policy toward Natural and Man-Made Disasters,”
focuses on the significance of changes in the expectations of disasters
for our understanding of their economic impact. He points out that the
infrequency of disasters, the spatial concentration of their effects, and
the size of disasters all raise the possibility that the expectations of disasters will change as a consequence of their occurrence. He cites this as
a distinguishing feature of disasters in comparison with hazards generally considered. In fact, he claims that this is the most underresearched
aspect of the economics of disasters.
Yezer’s analysis of the impact of disasters on disaster expectations
reveals several possible models of response. His analysis is based on
the assumption that disaster expectations are formed on the basis of a
comparison of recent disaster occurrences with the historical record.
An increase in the frequency of disasters thus raises the expectations
of disasters. From this model of disaster expectation he draws conclusions about the relations between economic growth and disasters, the
incentives to develop land in disaster-prone areas, and the significance
of disaster expectations for insurance markets and public policy toward
disasters. Several puzzles regarding the relations between disasters and
economic growth, the optimal development of land in hazardous areas,
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and the market for disaster insurance can be better understood once one
considers that the occurrence of disasters will also change the expectations of disasters.
One of the important lessons he derives from his analysis is the need
to distinguish between expected and unexpected disasters in considering the economic impact of disasters. The magnitude of the economic
losses a disaster produces depends crucially on the difference between
expected losses and unanticipated losses. Among the conclusions Yezer
derives from this analysis is that the economic effects of a disaster are
dependent not only on the physical severity of the event but also on the
extent to which the event and its damage were anticipated. He therefore
concludes that government aid to disaster areas should be concentrated
on unanticipated disasters. While he recognizes that politically this may
not be feasible, he does find evidence that several federal disaster relief
policies adhere in some respects to this principle.
Hal Cochrane’s chapter, “The Economics of Disaster: Retrospect and
Prospect,” provides an overview of the development of the economics
of disasters. Its insights into reasons underlying the development of the
field will be of particular value to readers new to this subject. Cochrane
demonstrates that the analysis of disaster mitigation efforts was developed largely as an application of water resource economics combined
with insights from the economics of information. He provides an
excellent survey of the nature of the cost-loss trade-offs involved in
managing hazards as well as a very useful discussion of the value of
disaster forecasts in this framework. His application of this model to
the case of rising CO2 emissions and the uncertainty of the forecasts of
global warming is a simple but powerful example of the insights that
can be derived from the cost-loss model.
Cochrane points out that a correct estimate of losses is a key element in the cost-loss framework. In contrast to Yezer, Cochrane holds
the opinion that the housing markets provide little good evidence about
the extent to which hazards and particularly disasters are capitalized
in housing and land values. As a result he concludes that analysis of
housing and land market values offers an inadequate measure of the
willingness to pay for safety. He also points out that disasters yield
several distinct sorts of losses that are contentious and difficult to measure, including the loss of cultural community and assets of a historical
nature.
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The chapter concludes with a discussion about the use of inputoutput analysis as a means of measuring the impact of disasters on local
and regional economies. In Cochrane’s opinion, input-output analysis,
while a useful tool in the right context, has a fatal flaw in its application
to disasters, in that it is incapable of addressing the impacts of the supply-side bottlenecks in local and regional economies that occur in the
aftermath of disasters. Input-output analysis does not account for insufficient capacity. It is driven by variations on the demand side and thus
is inadequate to analyze the supply-side shocks so common in disaster
situations. Other techniques such as computable general equilibrium
models and econometric analysis are also found wanting in important
respects. Cochrane concludes with the advice that the unique nature of
these events implies that it might be difficult to draw general lessons
about the impact of disasters and to predict the pace of recovery, when
such analysis is often based on factors present in the predisaster setting
but absent in the postdisaster environment.
While much of the literature in the economics of disasters focuses on
market failures and the role of government in postdisaster relief efforts,
Peter Boettke and Daniel Smith, in their chapter, “Private Solutions to
Public Disasters: Self-Reliance and Social Resilience,” examine the
much-neglected role of the private sector and markets in the postdisaster recovery process, using post-Katrina New Orleans as an example.
They point out that while most of the discussion is focused on the role
that government should play, one needs to consider the important role
that private entities—both for-profit and nonprofit—can and do play
in the recovery process. Furthermore, they argue that one should also
consider that the attempts by private entities to cope with the recovery
process are often thwarted by government actions both pre- and postdisaster. For example, in New Orleans, government policies encouraged
people to locate in flood-prone areas and left them vulnerable to loss
because of inadequately constructed levees. In the aftermath of Katrina,
occupational and building code regulations thwarted private recovery
efforts and distorted the set of price signals necessary to ensure efficient
use of the available resources.
Boettke and Smith argue that the price system and private efforts
must be and have been an integral part of disaster recovery. However, in
disaster situations we are likely to want to suspend the use of the market
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and distort the price signals necessary to help with the recovery process, perhaps out of public concern to keep someone from profiting at
the expense of others. But Boettke and Smith argue that the pursuit by
entrepreneurs of profitable opportunities created by the disaster is the
basis of the economic recovery and that efforts to thwart those pursuits
are misguided and delay the recovery. Ironically, for-profit entities often
were the most civic-minded, responsive, and generous to the community in the aftermath of Katrina.
Daniel Sutter and Kevin M. Simmons, in their chapter, “The Socioeconomic Impact of Tornadoes,” point out that tornadoes constitute
one of the most common and frequent forms of disaster; they occur in
all 50 states and throughout the year. The authors concentrate on three
issues: the trend of losses due to tornadoes, the role of the National
Weather Service’s tornado warning program, and the cost-effectiveness of several tornado loss-mitigation strategies. Their research yields
some surprising results. They estimate that the largest segment of losses
caused by tornadoes—approximately two-thirds of the total—is the opportunity cost of time spent under tornado warnings. That so much of
the cost can be attributed to time spent under warnings is partly accounted for by the steady decrease in the losses attributable to tornado
fatalities during the past half-century.
The paper devotes considerable discussion to the factors contributing to tornado losses, including the time of day, the severity of the
winds, the location of the storm, and even the day of the week. However, of greatest interest to economists will be the authors’ discussion
of potential ways to minimize tornado losses and their estimates of the
cost-effectiveness of several mitigation strategies. Sutter and Simmons
find that attempts to minimize the time spent under warning have the
greatest potential, given that this time is the largest component of costs.
They claim that the recently adopted use of Storm-Based Warnings by
the National Weather Service has the potential to reduce losses by as
much as $1 billion per year. In addition, increasing the lead time of
warnings also appears to be a cost-effective strategy, up to a point.
Conversely, Sutter and Simmons find that tornado shelters are rarely
cost-effective means of reducing casualty losses, in that the cost to save
a life exceeds the value statistically assigned to a life. They estimate
that even with the widespread use of shelters in a tornado-prone area

Introduction 7

like Oklahoma, it would cost about $57 million per life saved. However,
they do find that significant value has resulted from the more stringent
regulation of manufactured home construction mandated by HUD in
1994. They find that these regulations have reduced losses stemming
from casualties significantly and in a relatively cost-effective manner,
especially when compared to the cost of building shelters.
The chapters presented here give the reader a sample of the sort of
research now being undertaken on the economics of disasters. Several
themes long dominant in this literature are thoroughly discussed. These
include the ability of potential disaster victims to accurately assess the
risks they face, the role of incentives in ensuring that mitigation efforts are undertaken, the adequacy of our evaluation of the impact of
disasters on economies, and discussion of the effectiveness of current
government policies toward disaster prevention and relief. These will
in all likelihood continue to be topics of discussion in the future as well.
I hope the following chapters will give readers insight into the current
state of debate on these issues.

Reference
Stigler, George. 1992. “The Process and Progress of Economics.” In Lectures,
Economics 1981–1990, Karl-Göran Mäler, ed. Singapore: World Scientific
Publishing Co., pp. 57–76. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/
laureates/1982/stigler-lecture.pdf (accessed October 27, 2009).
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Market and Government
Failure in Insuring and
Mitigating Natural Catastrophes
How Long-Term Contracts Can Help
Howard C. Kunreuther
Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan
University of Pennsylvania

Insurance plays a vital role in America’s economy by helping
households and businesses manage risks . . . When insurance
prices reflect underlying economic costs they can encourage a
more efficient allocation of resources. Efforts to keep premiums
for insurance against catastrophe hazards artificially low, whether
through regulation or through subsidized government programs,
can encourage excessively risky behavior on the part of those who
might be affected by future catastrophes.
—Council of Economic Advisers (2007)1

Given the hundreds of billions of dollars in economic losses due
to catastrophes in the United States since 2001, it is difficult to realize that when Hurricane Hugo hit the country in 1989, it was the first
catastrophe to inflict more than $1 billion in insured losses. But times
have changed because of a series of unprecedented large-scale natural
disasters in the United States during the past few years. Times have
changed because of the increased terrorism threat worldwide, including the potential for nuclear attacks. Times have changed because of
the possibility of international pandemics and world cyber-failure, and
because of the financial crises we are currently experiencing. In other
words, we have entered a new era of catastrophes.
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While all of the above risks are different in character, they share
two important features: 1) uncertainty regarding their occurrence and
2) wide variance in losses from one year to the next. Experts and decision makers face challenges in assessing the risks associated with these
extreme events, in developing strategies for reducing future losses, and
in facilitating the recovery process following a major catastrophe.
As for natural disasters, the world has experienced large-scale
losses and fatalities because of the increasing concentration of population and activities in high-risk coastal regions. In Southeast Asia, the
tsunami in December 2004 killed more than 280,000 people residing
in coastal areas. Cyclone Nargis, which made landfall in Myanmar in
May 2008, killed an estimated 140,000 people, making it the deadliest
natural disaster in the country’s recorded history. The same month, the
Great Sichuan Earthquake in China is estimated to have killed nearly
70,000 people, injured 374,000, and made almost 5 million homeless
(Munich Re 2008). Deaths from the Haitian earthquake in January 2010
are estimated at 200,000 (European Commission 2010).
But even in a developed country like the United States, which has
both extensive experience with natural catastrophes and the resources to
adequately prepare for them, the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons demonstrated a lack of adequate loss reduction measures and emergency
preparedness capacity to deal with large-scale natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina, which hit Louisiana and Mississippi at the end of August
2005, killed 1,300 people and forced 1.5 million people to evacuate
the affected area—a record number for the country. Economic damages
were estimated in the range of $150 billion to $200 billion.
After two relatively quiet hurricane seasons in 2006 and 2007 in
the United States, a series of hurricanes made landfall in 2008, causing
billions of dollars in direct economic losses along the Caribbean Basin
and in the United States. Hurricane Ike was the most expensive individual event in 2008, with an estimated privately insured loss of $16
billion, followed by Hurricane Gustav, with insured losses estimated at
$4 billion. Based on these figures, Hurricane Ike ranks as the third most
devastating weather-related disaster in U.S. history, after Hurricane
Katrina and Hurricane Andrew, which hit southeast Florida in August
1992 (Swiss Re 2008).
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These recent catastrophes highlight the challenges of mitigating the
effects of natural disasters and financing recovery from them, issues
that are now high on the business and policy agendas of many countries. The question is not whether other large-scale catastrophes will
occur, but when and how frequently they will strike, and the extent of
the damage and fatalities they will cause. Now is the time to develop
and implement economically sound policies and strategies for managing the risk and consequences of future disasters. It is important for
us to take a longer-term view of these issues, given the tendency of
individuals to be myopic in their thinking and to misperceive risks. A
coherent strategy is necessary to ensure a sustainable recovery from
large-scale disasters and the appropriate future development of hazardprone areas. But these issues are complex. They challenge our capacity
as a nation to work together despite different agendas of key stakeholders and legislators regarding the role and responsibilities of the private
and public sectors in dealing with catastrophic risks. Absence of leadership in this area will inevitably lead to unnecessary loss of lives and
economic destruction in the devastated regions.
This chapter complements other analyses in this volume by focusing on the risk of large-scale natural disasters, although we believe the
concepts and proposals for managing these risks more effectively have
relevance to other types of extreme events such as terrorism and catastrophic accidents.2 The chapter is organized as follows: in the next
section we discuss the evolution over the past four decades of economic
and insured losses due to major catastrophes and the key drivers of this
change. We then propose four guiding principles for developing sustainable insurance and mitigation programs and analyze the behavioral
biases, notably myopia, that discourage individuals from investing in
cost-effective protective measures. To overcome these biases, we propose long-term insurance contracts combined with long-term loans. We
then demonstrate how the National Flood Insurance Program is a natural candidate for these contracts. The chapter concludes with a brief
summary and suggestions for future research.
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A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES
Recent Changes in the Impacts of Extreme Events
The economic and insured losses from great natural catastrophes
such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods worldwide have increased
significantly in recent years, as shown in Figure 2.1. (Each vertical bar
represents the total economic losses, and the darker zone represents
the insured portion of it.) A comparison of these economic losses over
time reveals a huge increase: $53.6 billion (1950–1959), $93.3 billion
(1960–1969), $161.7 billion (1970–1979), $262.9 billion (1980–1989),
and $778.3 billion (1990–1999). Between 2000 and 2008, losses totaled
$620.6 billion, principally as a result of the 2004, 2005, and 2008 hurricane seasons, which wrought historic levels of destruction.
Figure 2.1 Evolution of Great Natural Catastrophes Worldwide,
1950–2008
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NOTE: In billions of U.S. dollars, indexed to 2008. Dotted line indicates trend in overall losses. Solid line indicates trend in insured losses.
SOURCE: Munich Re (2009a).
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Catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on insurers since
1990 than in the entire history of insurance. Between 1970 and the mid1980s, annual insured losses from natural disasters (including forest
fires) were in the $3 billion to $4 billion range. The insured losses from
Hurricane Hugo, which made landfall in Charleston, South Carolina,
in September 1989, exceeded $4 billion (in 1989 dollars). There was a
radical increase in insured losses in the early 1990s, as Hurricane Andrew struck Florida ($23.7 billion in 2007 dollars) and the Northridge
earthquake hit California ($19.6 billion in 2007 dollars). The four hurricanes that struck Florida in 2004 (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne)
collectively totaled almost $33 billion in insured losses. Hurricane Katrina alone cost insurers and reinsurers an estimated $46 billion, and
total losses paid by private insurers resulting from major natural catastrophes in 2005 reached $87 billion.3 Figure 2.2 depicts the upward
trend in worldwide insured losses from catastrophes between 1970 and
2008.4
Table 2.1 reveals the 25 most costly insured catastrophes from 1970
to 2008 (in 2008 dollars). Of these 25 major events, 14 occurred after
2001, and 12 of happened in the United States. Hurricane Andrew and
the Northridge earthquake were the first two catastrophes that the industry experienced with losses greater than $10 billion (designated as
super-cats), and they caused insurers to reflect on whether risks from
natural disasters were still insurable. To assist them in making this determination, many firms began using catastrophe models to estimate the
likelihood and consequences to their insured portfolios from specific
disasters in hazard-prone areas (Grossi and Kunreuther 2005). With
the exception of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, all of the
events in the top 25 were natural disasters. More than 80 percent of
these were weather-related events—hurricanes and typhoons, storms,
and floods—and nearly three-quarters of the claims were made in the
United States.
Losses resulting from natural catastrophes and man-made disasters
in 2006 were far below the losses in 2004 and 2005. Of the $48 billion
in catastrophe-related economic losses, $16 billion was covered by insurance ($11 billion for natural disasters and $5 billion for man-made).
During the past 25 years, only 1988 and 1997 had insured losses lower
than those in 2006. According to Munich Re (2008), there were 960
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Figure 2.2 Worldwide Evolution of Catastrophe-Insured Losses,
1970–2008
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SOURCE: Wharton Risk Center, with data from Swiss Re and the Insurance Information
Institute.

natural catastrophes in 2007, the most since 1974. They inflicted nearly
$27 billion in insured losses. Swiss Re estimates that insured losses
soared to $50 billion for the industry in 2008, making it one of the
three costliest years ever. Natural catastrophes accounted for $43 billion of these losses, with man-made disasters making up the remaining
$7 billion (Swiss Re 2008). In 2009, insured losses from catastrophes
amounted to $22 billion, a lower figure due to a very benign North Atlantic hurricane season (Munich Re 2009b).
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The occurrence of damaging hurricanes is highly variable and
uncertain from year to year. However, it is almost certain that in the
coming years more catastrophic hurricanes will strike the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts. Other parts of the nation will experience severe floods (as
occurred in the Upper Midwest in 2008) and earthquakes, causing extreme damage to residential and commercial property and infrastructure.
There is a very clear message from these data. Only 20 or 30 years
ago, large-scale natural disasters were considered low-probability
events. Today, not only are they causing considerably greater economic
losses than in the past, they also appear to be occurring at an accelerating pace. In this context, it is important to understand more fully the
factors influencing these changes so as to design more effective programs for reducing losses from future disasters.
The Question of Attribution
At least two principal socioeconomic factors directly influence
the level of economic losses due to catastrophic events: 1) degree of
urbanization and 2) value at risk. In 1950, approximately 30 percent
of the world’s population lived in cities. In 2000, about 50 percent of
the world’s population (6 billion) resided in urban areas. Projections
by the United Nations (2004) show that by 2025, that figure will have
increased to 60 percent, based on a world population estimate of 8.3
billion people.
In the United States in 2003, 53 percent of the nation’s population,
or 153 million people, lived in the 673 U.S. coastal counties, an increase
of 33 million people since 1980, according to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). And the nation’s coastal population is expected to increase by more than 12 million by 2015 (Crossett
et al. 2004).5 Yet coastal counties, excluding Alaska, account for only
17 percent of the land area in the United States.
In hazard-prone areas, this urbanization and increase of population
also translates into greater concentration of exposure and hence a higher
likelihood of catastrophic losses from future disasters. Insurance density
is another critical socioeconomic factor to consider when evaluating
the evolution of insured loss due to weather-related catastrophes. These
factors will continue to have a major impact on the level of insured
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Table 2.1 The 25 Most Costly Insured Catastrophes in the World, 1970–2008
Victims (dead
Event
$ billions
or missing)
Year
Area of primary damage
Hurricane Katrina
48.1
1,836
2005
U.S., Gulf of Mexico, et al.

Hurricane Frances

5.8

38

2004

U.S., Bahamas

Winter Storm Vivian

5.2

64

1990

Western/Central Europe

Typhoon Bart

5.2

26

1999

Japan

Hurricane Gustav

5.0

153

2008

U.S., Caribbean, et al.

Hurricane Georges

4.7

600

1998

U.S., Caribbean

Tropical Storm Allison

4.4

41

2001

U.S.

Hurricane Jeanne

4.4

3,034

2004

U.S., Caribbean, et al.

Typhoon Songda

4.0

45

2004

Japan, South Korea

Storms

3.7

45

2003

U.S.

Hurricane Floyd

3.6

70

1999

U.S., Bahamas, Columbia

NOTE: Dollar amounts are indexed to 2008.
SOURCE: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009), with data from Swiss Re (2009) and the Insurance Information Institute in New York.
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losses from natural catastrophes. Given the growing concentration of
exposure on the Gulf Coast, another hurricane like Katrina hitting that
area is likely to inflict significant property damage unless strong mitigation measures are put in place.6
In order to better understand this new vulnerability, it is possible to
calculate the total direct economic cost of the major hurricanes in the
United States in the past century, adjusted for inflation, population, and
wealth normalization. More specifically, one can estimate what each of
these hurricanes would have cost had it hit today. This exercise has been
done in several studies. The most recent one, by Pielke et al. (2008),
normalizes to the year 2005 mainland U.S. hurricane damage for the
period 1900–2005.
Table 2.2 provides estimates for the top 20 most costly hurricanes
if they had occurred in 2005, using two approaches for normalizing
these losses, each of which gives a cost estimate. The table indicates the
range of costs provided by these two estimates, the year the hurricane
occurred, the states that were most seriously affected, and the hurricane
category on the Saffir-Simpson scale. The data reveal that the hurricane
that hit Miami in 1926 would have been almost twice as costly as Hurricane Katrina had it occurred in 2005, and the Galveston hurricane of
1900 would have had total direct economic costs as high as those from
Katrina. This means that independent of any possible change in weather
patterns, we are very likely to see even more devastating disasters in the
coming years because of the ongoing growth in value located in riskprone areas.
There is another element to consider in determining how to adequately manage and finance catastrophic risks: the possible impact of
a change in climate on future weather-related catastrophes. Between
1970 and 2004, storms and floods were responsible for over 90 percent of the total economic costs of extreme weather-related events
worldwide. Storms (hurricanes in the U.S. region, typhoons in Asia,
and windstorms in Europe) contributed to over 75 percent of insured
losses. In constant prices (2004), insured losses from weather-related
events averaged $3 billion annually between 1970 and 1990 and then
increased significantly to $16 billion annually between 1990 and 2004
(Association of British Insurers 2005). In 2005, 99.7 percent of all catastrophic losses worldwide were due to weather-related events (Mills
and Lecomte 2006).

SOURCE: Data from Pielke et al. (2008).
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Table 2.2 Top 20 Hurricane Scenarios, Ranked Using 2005 Inflation, Population, and Wealth Normalization
(1900–2005)
Cost range ($ billion)
Rank
Hurricane
Year
Category
in 2005
1
Miami (southeast FL/MS/AL)
1926
4
140–157
2
Katrina (LA/MS)
2005
3
81
3
North Texas (Galveston)
1900
4
72–78
4
North Texas (Galveston)
1915
4
57–62
5
Andrew (southeast FL and LA)
1992
5–3
54–60
6
New England (CT/MA/NY/RI)
1938
3
37–39
7
Southwest Florida
1944
3
35–39
8
Lake Okeechobee (southeast Florida)
1928
4
32–34
9
Donna (FL/NC/NY)
1960
4–3
29–32
10
Camille (MS/southeast LA/VA)
1969
5
21–24
11
Betsy (southeast FL and LA)
1965
3
21–23
12
Wilma
2005
3
21
13
Agnes (FL/CT/NY)
1972
1
17–18
14
Diane (NC)
1955
1
17
15
4 (southeast FL/LA/AL/MS)
1947
4–3
15–17
16
Hazel (SC/NC)
1954
4
16–23
17
Charley (southwest FL)
2004
4
16
18
Carol (CT/NY/RI)
1954
3
15–16
19
Hugo (SC)
1989
4
15–16
20
Ivan (northwest FL/AL)
2004
3
15
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Numerous discussions and scientific debates have centered on
whether the series of major hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 might be
partially attributable to the impact of a change in climate.7 One of the
expected effects of global warming is an increase in hurricane intensity.
This has been predicted by theory and modeling, and substantiated by
empirical data on climate change. Higher ocean temperatures lead to
an exponentially higher evaporation rate in the atmosphere, which increases the intensity of cyclones and precipitation. The results to date
raise issues with respect to the insurability of weather-related catastrophes, given that an increase in the number of major hurricanes over a
shorter period of time is likely to translate into a greater number hitting
the coasts, with a greater likelihood of damage to a much larger number
of residences and commercial buildings today than in the 1940s.
The combination of increasing urbanization, concentration of value
in high-risk areas, and the potential impact of a change in weather patterns raises questions as to how the insurance industry will provide
protection against catastrophic risks in the future. Traditional insurance
relies on geographical and time diversification, both of which are somewhat compromised by these recent trends. The appropriate adoption of
roles and responsibilities by the private and public sectors (as a source
of financial support or as a market regulator) is critical in this regard.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MITIGATING AND INSURING
AGAINST CATASTROPHES
To help ascertain the roles the private and public sectors can play
in addressing these issues, we propose the following four guiding principles for using the insurance infrastructure to deal more effectively
with natural disasters:
Principle 1—Premiums should reflect risk. Insurance premiums
should be based on risk in order to provide signals to individuals as to
the hazards they face and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective
mitigation measures to reduce their vulnerability to catastrophes. Risk-
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based premiums should also reflect the cost of capital that insurers need
to integrate into their pricing to ensure adequate return to their investors.
The application of Principle 1 provides a clear signal of likely damage to those currently residing in areas subject to natural disasters and
those who are considering moving into these regions. Risk-based premiums would also enable insurers to provide discounts to homeowners
and businesses that invest in cost-effective loss-reduction mitigation
measures. If insurance premiums are not risk-based, insurers have no
economic incentive to offer these discounts. In fact, they prefer not to
offer coverage to these property owners because it is a losing proposition in the long run.
Principle 2—Deal with equity and affordability issues. Any special treatment given to homeowners currently residing in hazard-prone
areas (e.g., low-income uninsured or inadequately insured homeowners) should come from general public funding and not through insurance
premium subsidies.
Principle 2 reflects a concern for some residents in high-hazard
areas who will be faced with large premium increases if insurers are
permitted to adhere to Principle 1. As discussed in the next section,
regulations imposed by state insurance commissioners keep premiums
in many regions subject to hurricane damage artificially lower than the
risk-based level.
Note that Principle 2 applies only to individuals who currently
reside in a hazard-prone area. Those who decide to move to the area
in the future should be charged premiums that reflect the risk. If they
were provided with financial assistance from public sources to purchase insurance, the resulting public policy would directly encourage
development in hazard-prone areas and exacerbate the potential for
catastrophic losses from future disasters.
Principle 3—Have sufficient demand for coverage. The demand
by individuals and firms for insurance coverage with risk-based premiums should be sufficiently high that insurers can cover the fixed costs
of introducing a program for providing coverage and spreading the risk
broadly throughout their portfolios. High demand for insurance would
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also reduce the level of state and federal relief to uninsured or underinsured homeowners in the aftermath of the next disaster.
Principle 4—Minimize likelihood of insolvency. Insurers and
reinsurers should determine how much coverage to offer, and what premium to charge against the risk so that the chances of insolvency are
below some predefined acceptable level.
Insurance regulators should play an important role in ensuring that
insurers providing coverage in high-risk areas have a solid financial
basis for doing so.

THE BEHAVIORAL CHALLENGES: THE DEMAND
FOR INSURANCE AND MITIGATION
How effective can mitigation be in reducing exposure to future disaster? To shed some light on this question, we undertook an analysis
of the impact that mitigation would have on reducing losses from hurricanes in four states: Florida, New York, South Carolina, and Texas
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). In our analysis we consider two
extreme cases: one in which no one has invested in mitigation, and
one in which everyone has invested in predefined mitigation measures.
From the U.S. Hurricane Model developed by the catastrophe modeling
firm Risk Management Solutions, losses were calculated on a groundup and gross basis, assuming an appropriate mitigation measure across
the insured portfolio. The mitigation measures were selected based on
various assumptions for the different regions. For example, in Florida,
the requirements were those defined by the Institute for Business and
Home Safety’s “Fortified . . . for safer living” program. As this program
is only for new construction, when we describe an analysis using these
recommendations, it is the retrofit techniques that are aligned with the
features of the Fortified program. In New York, South Carolina, and
Texas, mitigation means the application of the latest building codes to
the residential structures.8
Table 2.3 indicates the differences in losses and savings from adoption of mitigation measures for hurricanes with return periods of 100,

Table 2.3 Money Saved in Reduced Losses from Full Mitigation for Different Return Periods
100-year event

250-year event
Savings
Savings
Savings
in reduced
in reduced
in reduced
Savings in
Unmitigated reduced losses losses from Unmitigated losses from losses from
mitigation
mitigation
losses
from mitigation mitigation
losses
(%)
(%)
($ billions) ($ billions)
State ($ billions) ($ billions)
FL
84
51
61
126
69
55
NY
6
2
39
13
5
37
SC
4
2
44
7
3
41
TX
17
6
34
27
9
32

500-year event
Savings
Savings
in reduced in reduced
Unmitigated losses from losses from
mitigation mitigation
losses
(%)
($ billions)
($ billions)
160
83
52
19
7
35
9
4
39
37
12
31

SOURCE: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009).
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250, and 500 years for each of the four states we are studying when
these loss-reduction measures are in place. The analyses reveal that
mitigation has the potential to reduce losses from future hurricanes by
amounts ranging from 61 percent in Florida for a 100-year return period
loss, to 31 percent in the state of Texas for a 500-year return period loss.
In Florida alone, the use of mitigation leads to a $51 billion reduction in
losses for a 100-year event and $83 billion for a 500-year event. These
findings are important given the cost of capital needed to cover the tail
of the distribution of extreme events. Adoption of mitigation measures
on residential structures significantly reduces, if not eliminates, this tail
in each of these four states.
The challenge, however, lies in making sure residents in hazardprone areas invest in these mitigation measures. Indeed, recent extreme
events have highlighted the challenges associated with reducing losses
from hurricanes and other natural hazards due to what one of us has
termed the natural disaster syndrome (Kunreuther 1996). Many homeowners, private businesses, and public sector organizations in hazardprone areas do not voluntarily adopt cost-effective loss-reduction measures, making these areas highly vulnerable and unprepared should a
severe hurricane or other natural disaster occur. The magnitude of the
destruction following a catastrophe often leads governmental agencies
to provide disaster relief to victims even if prior to the event the government claimed that it had no intention of doing so. This combination of
underinvestment in protection prior to the catastrophic event and partial
financing of the recovery by the general taxpayer can be critiqued on
both efficiency and equity grounds.
A range of informal mechanisms explain this natural disaster syndrome. One relates to framing the problem imperfectly: experts focus
on the likelihood and consequences as two key elements of the risk.
Several studies show, however, that individuals rarely seek out probability estimates in making their decisions. When these data are given
to them, decision makers often do not use the information. In one study,
researchers found that only 22 percent of subjects sought out probability information when evaluating several risky managerial decisions.
People have particular difficulty dealing with probabilistic information
for small-likelihood events. They need a context in which to evaluate
the likelihood of an event occurring. They have a hard time gauging
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how concerned to feel about a 1 in 100,000 probability of death without
some comparison points. Most people just do not know whether 1 in
100,000 is a large risk or a small risk. In one study, individuals could
not distinguish the relative safety of a chemical plant that had an annual
chance of experiencing a catastrophic accident that varied from 1 in
10,000 to 1 in 1 million (Kunreuther, Novemsky, and Kahneman 2001).
There is also evidence that firms and residents tend to ignore risks
whose subjective odds are seen as falling below some threshold. Prior
to a disaster, many individuals perceive its likelihood as sufficiently
low that they contend, “It won’t happen to me.” As a result, they do
not feel the need to invest voluntarily in protective measures, such as
strengthening their houses or buying insurance. It is only after the disaster occurs that these same individuals express remorse that they didn’t
undertake protective measures.
Individuals also do not invest in protective measures because they
are highly myopic and tend to focus on the returns for only the next
couple of years. In addition, there is extensive experimental evidence
showing that human temporal discounting tends to be hyperbolic, so that
events in the distant future are disproportionately discounted relative to
immediate ones. As an example, people are willing to pay more to have
the timing of the receipt of a cash prize accelerated from tomorrow to
today than from the day after tomorrow to tomorrow (Loewenstein and
Prelec 1991). The implication of hyperbolic discounting for mitigation
decisions is that residents are expected to invest a tangible fixed sum
now to achieve a future benefit that they instinctively undervalue—and
that, paradoxically, they hope never to see at all. The effect of placing
too much weight on immediate considerations is that the upfront costs
of mitigation will loom disproportionately large relative to the delayed
expected benefits from loss mitigation over time.
Extensive evidence indicates that residents in hazard-prone areas
do not undertake loss-prevention measures voluntarily. A 1974 survey
of more than 1,000 California homeowners in earthquake-prone areas
revealed that only 12 percent of the respondents had adopted any protective measure (Kunreuther et al. 1978). Fifteen years later, there was
little change despite the increased public awareness of the earthquake
hazard. In a 1989 survey of 3,500 homeowners in four California counties at risk from earthquakes, only 5 to 9 percent of the respondents in
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these areas reported adopting any loss reduction measures (Palm et al.
1990). Burby et al. (1988) and Laska (1991) have found a similar reluctance by residents in flood-prone areas to invest in mitigation measures.
In the case of flood damage, Burby (2006) provides compelling
evidence that actions taken by the federal government, such as constructing levees, make residents feel safe, when in fact they are still
in harm’s way should the levee be breached or overtopped. This problem is reinforced by local public officials who fail to enforce building
codes or to impose land-use regulations to restrict development in highhazard areas. If developers do not design homes to be resistant to disasters and individuals do not voluntarily adopt mitigation measures,
one can expect large-scale losses following a catastrophic event, as evidenced by the property damage to New Orleans caused by Hurricane
Katrina.
Even after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, a
large number of residents had still not invested in relatively inexpensive loss-reduction measures for their property, nor had they undertaken
emergency preparedness measures. A survey of 1,100 adults living
along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts conducted in May 2006 revealed that
83 percent of the responders had taken no steps to fortify their homes,
68 percent had no hurricane survival kit, and 60 percent had no family
disaster plan (Goodnough 2006). As noted above, homeowners’ failure
to invest in cost-effective mitigation measures or to purchase adequate
insurance coverage if not required to do so stems from behavioral and
psychological biases. As a means to address these issues, we suggest
the use of long-term contracts.

A NEW CONCEPT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-TERM
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
We propose moving from the standard one-year insurance contracts for homeowners and flood insurance for residential properties to
long-term insurance (LTI) to encourage property owners to invest in
cost-effective mitigation measures.9 In the case of homeowners coverage (which includes protection against the effects of wind damage, but
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not flood losses), some insurers have recently restricted the sale of new
homeowners policies in hurricane-prone areas. Policyholders cannot
help but worry that their existing coverage might be subject to unexpected cancellation or very significant premium increases, particularly
if severe hurricane damage occurs in the near future.
Need for Long-Term Insurance
Short-term insurance policies foster significant social costs.
Evidence from recent disasters reveals that consumers who fail to adequately protect their homes or even insure at all create a welfare cost
to themselves and a possible cost to all taxpayers in the form of government disaster assistance. Under the current U.S. system, the governor of
a stricken state can request that the president declare a “major disaster”
and offer special assistance if the damage is severe enough. The number of presidential disaster declarations has dramatically increased over
the past 50 years: there were 162 during the period 1955–1965, 282
during 1966–1975, 319 during 1986–1995, and 545 during 1996–2005
(Michel-Kerjan 2006).
The development of LTI should also encourage individuals to invest in cost-effective mitigation measures. As previously pointed out,
many homeowners do not invest in such measures due to myopia and
budget constraints. They are unwilling to incur the high upfront cost
associated with these investments relative to the small premium discount they would receive the following year reflecting the expected
reduction in annual insured losses (Kunreuther, Meyer, and MichelKerjan, forthcoming). If an LTI policy was coupled with a long-term
home improvement loan tied to the mortgage, the reduction in insurance premiums would exceed the annual loan payment. LTI coupled
with long-term mitigation loans over a number of years could yield
significant social welfare benefits: less damage to property, reduction in
costs of protection against catastrophic losses by insurers, more secure
mortgages, and lower costs to the government for disaster assistance.
Why Does a Market for Long-Term Insurance Not Exist Today?
In his seminal work on uncertainty and welfare economics, Kenneth Arrow defined “the absence of marketability for an action which is
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identifiable, technologically possible, and capable of influencing some
individuals’ welfare . . . as a failure of the existing market to provide a
means whereby the services can be both offered and demanded upon the
payment of a price” (Arrow 1963). Here we shall discuss several factors that have contributed to the nonmarketability of LTI for protecting
homeowners’ property against losses from fire, theft, and large-scale
natural disasters. We discuss elements that affect both the supply and
demand sides.
Supply side
Today, due to political pressure, insurance rates are frequently restricted to be artificially low in hazard-prone areas, as illustrated by
Florida’s actions in recent years. As a result, the risks most subject to
catastrophic losses also become the most unattractive for insurers. This
premium regulation also results in a second stumbling block: insurers
are uncertain how much they will be allowed to charge in the future.
Uncertainty regarding costs of capital and changes in risk over time
may also deter insurers from providing long-term insurance. In principle, of course, insurers could add a component in their premiums to
account for the costs created by these factors. However, insurance regulators, presumed to be representing consumers’ interests, may not allow
these costs to be embedded in the approved premiums. Furthermore, it
is unclear what the voluntary demand for coverage will be, given the
resulting premiums. In a real sense, a new and less intrusive format
for government regulation of insurance markets may be required if the
private sector is to be successful in dealing with time-varying risks and
capital costs.
Insurers might also be concerned about possible changes in the level
of risk over time. For example, global warming could trigger more
intense weather-related disasters, or local environmental degradation
might change the risk landscape in the next several decades. One way
to address this concern would be to make contracts renegotiable at a
specified interval based on new information validated by the scientific
community, much like renegotiable loans with adjustable rates (e.g.,
every five years).
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Demand side
Some homeowners may worry about the financial solvency of their
insurers over a long period, particularly if they are concerned about
being locked into an LTI contract. Consumers might also fear being
overcharged if insurers set premiums that reflect the uncertainty associated with long-term risks. Furthermore, those who have not suffered
a loss for 10 years but have a 25-year LTI may feel that the premiums
are unfairly priced. It is thus essential that the design of an LTI contract
anticipate these concerns and be transparent to the policyholder.
Developing an LTI Policy
Jaffee, Kunreuther, and Michel-Kerjan (2008) have developed a
simple two-period model in a competitive market setting, where premiums reflect risk, to compare the expected benefits of annual contracts
versus LTI. The authors show that an LTI policy reduces the marketing
costs for insurers compared with single-period policies, and also reduces the search costs to consumers if their insurer decides to cancel its
policy at the end of period 1. If an LTI policyholder can cancel at the end
of period 1 on learning that the cost of a 1-period policy is low enough
to justify paying a cancellation cost (C), then it is always optimal for
the insurer to offer an LTI policy and for the consumer to purchase one.
The insurer will set C at a level that enables it to break even on those
policies that are canceled before the maturity date. We should note that
if one is going to develop any type of LTI policy that would be marketed by the private sector, then premiums need to reflect risk (Principle
1). If insurers can charge prices that enable them to break even, they
will have incentives to develop new products. Under the current state
regulatory arrangements, where many insurance commissioners have
limited insurers’ ability to charge risk-based premiums in hazard-prone
areas, no insurance company would even entertain the possibility of
marketing an LTI policy. Insurers would be concerned that the regulator
would clamp down on them now or in the future regarding what price
they could charge, so that a long-term contract would be infeasible from
a financial point of view.
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A NATURAL CANDIDATE FOR LONG-TERM INSURANCE:
FLOOD INSURANCE THROUGH THE NFIP
Given the existing tension between state insurance regulators and
the insurance industry, we feel that it is best politically to introduce
LTI by focusing on flood insurance, since this coverage is provided by
the federal government here in the United States. The National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) was created in 1968 as a result of insurers’
refusal to cover this risk because they viewed it as uninsurable. In 2007,
the NFIP sold over 5.5 million policies (compared to 2.5 million in
1992) and covered over $1.1 trillion in assets (compared to only $237
billion in 1992). These figures were stable in 2008 (Michel-Kerjan and
Kousky, forthcoming).
It would be useful to consider whether one could make flood insurance policies long-term by tying them to mortgages. This practice
would connect insurance directly to the property, rather than to the
homeowner. One might also consider requiring everyone in flood-prone
areas to take out the insurance, just as those who own a car are required
to take out automobile insurance today whether or not they are financing the purchase of their car. If a homeowner moved to another location,
the flood insurance policy would remain with the property.
Why Have a Long-Term Flood Insurance Policy?
A long-term flood insurance program would offer homeowners currently residing in flood-prone areas a fixed rate for a fixed period of
time (e.g., 5, 10, or 20 years). If the homeowner moved away from
the area before the end of the policy period, then the insurance policy
would automatically be transferred to the new property owner at the
same rate. For those homeowners being charged subsidized rates because their homes were constructed before their community joined the
NFIP, these rates would be maintained for the length of the policy period. For homeowners who constructed homes after their community
joined the program, rates would be actuarially based.
For a number of reasons, such a long-term flood insurance policy
would be a great improvement over the current annual policies from
the perspective of the relevant stakeholders: homeowners, the Federal
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Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), banks and financial institutions, and the general taxpayer. Assigning a fixed rate to flood insurance
would provide financial stability to homeowners. They would also
know that they are protected against water damage from floods and
hurricanes. This would reduce the legal problems that have stemmed
from recent hurricanes (such as the Florida hurricanes of 2004, Katrina,
and Ike).
Long-term flood insurance would also ensure the spread of risk
within the program, since most homeowners in flood-prone areas would
be covered. Requiring flood insurance for all homeowners residing in
hazard-prone areas would provide an even larger spread of risk. This
larger policy base would provide much-needed financial revenue for the
program over time.
Long-term policies would prevent individuals from canceling their
policies after they have not experienced a flood for several years. Some
individuals currently do this even if they are required to hold the policy
as a condition for a federally insured mortgage. The banks and financial
institutions have often not enforced this regulation because few of them
have been fined or because the mortgages are transferred to banks in
non-flood-prone regions of the country that have not focused on either
the flood hazard risk or the requirement that homeowners may have to
purchase this coverage. Consider the flood in August 1998 that damaged property in northern Vermont. Of the 1,549 victims of this disaster,
FEMA found 84 percent of the homeowners in Special Flood Hazard
Areas (SFHAs) did not have insurance, even though 45 percent of these
individuals were required to purchase this coverage (Tobin and Calfee
2005).
If banks offered long-term loans for mitigation, individuals with
long-term flood insurance policies would be encouraged to invest in
cost-effective risk reduction measures. To highlight this point, consider
the following simple example. Suppose a property owner’s investment
of $1,500 in floodproofing would reduce by $30,000 the water damage
from a future flood or hurricane with an annual probability of 1 in 100.
The NFIP should be willing to reduce the annual premium by $300 (i.e.,
1/100 × $30,000) to reflect the lower expected losses that would occur
if a flood or hurricane hit the area. If the house was expected to last for
10 or more years, the net present value of the expected benefit of invest-
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ing in this measure would exceed the upfront cost at an annual discount
rate as high as 15 percent.
In the current system, many property owners would hesitate to make
the $1,500 expenditure, because they would get only $300 back next
year and might consider the benefits over only the next few years when
making their decisions. If they underweight the future, the expected
discounted benefits would likely be less than the $1,500 upfront cost.
In addition, budget constraints could discourage them from investing
in the mitigation measure. Other considerations that could play a role
in the decision not to invest in these measures include uncertainty as to
how long the family will reside in the house and whether their insurer
would reward them again when their policy is renewed. There may also
be a failure to appreciate the interdependencies associated with floods,
earthquakes, and other disasters. That is, investing in mitigation measures can reduce not only the potential losses to one’s own property but
the damage to neighboring structures.
If a 20-year flood insurance policy was tied to the property, then the
homeowner could take out a 20-year, $1,500 home improvement loan
linked to the mortgage at an annual interest rate of 10 percent, resulting
in payments of $145 per year. If the insurance premium was reduced by
$300, the savings to the homeowner each year would be $155. Alternatively, this loan could be incorporated as part of the mortgage at an even
lower interest rate than 10 percent.
Long-term insurance and mitigation loans would constitute new financial products. A bank would have a financial incentive to provide
this type of loan, since it would be better protected against a catastrophic
loss to the property, and the NFIP would know that its potential loss
from a major disaster had been reduced. Moreover, this scenario would
reduce the likelihood of large tax-dollar expenditures for disaster relief.
Indeed, prior to the 2005 hurricane season, which inflicted nearly $18
billion in flood claims, the NFIP had a cumulative deficit of about $3
billion after 37 years of operation (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, forthcoming). LTI thus offers a win-win situation for all.
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CONCLUSION
Since the 1990s, a series of large-scale catastrophes have inflicted
historic economic and insured losses. More than half of the 25 most
costly insured catastrophes worldwide between 1970 and 2008 occurred
after 2001, and all were natural disasters except for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The United States has been particularly challenged, since 12 of
these 25 disasters for insurance occurred in this country. The growing
concentration of population and structures in high-risk areas, combined
with the potential consequences of global warming, are likely to lead
to even more devastating catastrophes in the coming years unless costeffective risk reduction measures are put in place.
The challenge facing the United States and many other countries
is ascertaining how to encourage residents and businesses to invest in
loss-reduction measures and insurance in advance of a disaster so as to
avoid the need for large-scale governmental disaster relief after a catastrophe occurs. Indeed, even when risk reduction measures are available
and are cost-effective, many people are still not investing in them. Following a disaster, government agencies provide assistance to the area.
We term this the natural disaster syndrome.
Several instances of the natural disaster syndrome have occurred
in recent years. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many victims
suffered severe losses from flooding because they had not used mitigation measures in their homes and did not have flood insurance to cover
the resulting damage. The affected individuals and communities consequently received an unprecedented level of federal disaster assistance.
There are many reasons why those in harm’s way have not undertaken
protective measures in advance of disaster. Many individuals believe
that the event will not happen to them. In the case of New Orleans,
some residents may have believed that they were fully protected by
flood control measures such as the levees.10 Such beliefs have led to
increased development in hazard-prone areas without appropriate landuse regulations or properly enforced building codes. In addition, budget
constraints and short time horizons may limit people’s ability and desire
to invest in hazard mitigation measures and to purchase insurance. Such
a dynamic has been observed in many countries around the world.
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We propose a new initiative that could address these issues: longterm insurance contracts coupled with long-term loans to encourage
the adoption of cost-effective mitigation measures and provide stability
to homeowners. Given the benefits and potential difficulties of implementing such a program, we conclude that flood insurance would be
a natural candidate for such a long-term program. Given, too, that the
NFIP is up for renewal in 2010, there may be the political will to develop more effective solutions.
There is an opportunity for the Obama administration and Congress
to take steps now to reduce these losses and protect the nation against
extreme events in a more systematic way than the government has to
date. We need a more coherent national strategy for managing these
risks in a new era of catastrophes.
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This chapter was originally prepared for the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research’s conference “Private Markets and Public Insurance Programs,”
held at the Wohlstetter Conference Center, Washington, DC, January 15, 2009, and
appears in Public Insurance and Private Markets, Jeffrey R. Brown, ed., AEI Press
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Grant #2008-GA-T8-K004). The views and
opinions expressed are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the U.S. government or FEMA.
1. It is quite remarkable that 2007 was the first year that the Economic Report of the
President devoted a chapter to catastrophic risk insurance.
2. For a detailed analysis on terrorism insurance by the authors, see Kunreuther and
Michel-Kerjan (2004), Wharton Risk Center (2005), Michel-Kerjan and Pedell
(2006), and Michel-Kerjan, Raschky, and Kunreuther (2010). For a detailed analysis of the question of natural disaster insurance and mitigation in the United States,
see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009).
3. This figure excludes payment by the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) for damage due to 2005 flooding (over $20 billion in claims).
4. Munich Re and Swiss Re, the two leading reinsurers in the world, do not use the
same definition of catastrophic losses. Natural disasters inflicting insured losses
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5.

6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

above $38.7 million or total losses above $77.5 million are considered major catastrophes by Swiss Re. Munich Re uses a higher threshold, which explains the
difference between Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. For example, when Munich Re estimated insured loss from natural disasters at about $42 billion in 2004, Swiss Re’s
estimate was over $52 billion.
These numbers vary depending on the definition of “coastal counties” one considers. The less restrictive definition, the one used for the figures in the text and
applying to 53 percent of the U.S. population, includes lakes. Taking a more restrictive definition (i.e., any county that has a coastline bordering the open ocean
or associated sheltered water bodies or a county that contains V zones—velocity
flood zones, or areas likely to have floodwaters of great velocity—as defined by
the National Flood Insurance Program), one still finds that the proportion of the
population living in such counties is 30 percent (Crowell et al. 2007).
For additional data on the economic impact of future catastrophic hurricanes, see
Rust and Killinger (2006), sec. 1:13–1:26.
For more details on the scientific evidence regarding climate change and its impact, see Stern (2007).
We are assuming that because these measures are incorporated in building codes
they are cost-effective. In other words, the discounted long-term expected benefit
from the mitigation measure over the projected life of the house is greater than its
upfront costs. By obtaining detailed cost estimates for specific mitigation measures incorporated in building codes or Florida’s “Fortified . . . for safer living”
program, one could rank their relative cost-effectiveness.
This section draws heavily on Jaffee, Kunreuther, and Michel-Kerjan (2008).
FEMA clearly thought that the levees would provide this protection. Otherwise it
would have designated the Lower Ninth Ward as a hazard-prone area and residents
would have been eligible for flood insurance.
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Expectations and Unexpected
Consequences of Public
Policy toward Natural and
Man-Made Disasters
Anthony M. Yezer
George Washington University

For the purposes of this chapter, I define disasters very generally as
large, sudden, infrequent occurrences that are difficult to forecast and
that result in significant economic loss in the form of output, income,
property, and life. Particular attention is given to disasters that are geographically concentrated as opposed to events like global depressions.
This definition is broad enough to cover such disparate events as a regional recession, earthquake, hurricane, drought, oil spill, or terrorist
attack.
A general approach to disasters has three advantages. First, the
principle of parsimony holds that it is desirable to explain as many
phenomena as possible with a single theory. Second, generality allows
results developed for one type of disaster event to inform our thinking about the economic effects of other disaster types.1 Third, models
that claim to explain the effects of many different types of disasters are
much easier to refute than those with few testable implications or with
narrow predictive power. Theories that are easily refuted should inspire
the strongest beliefs in other theories where there is an absence of successful refutation. Put another way, if someone advances a theory of the
effects of Hurricane Katrina and claims that it is uniquely appropriate
for the U.S. Gulf Coast, the theory is not likely to be generally useful
and, because it is based on a single data point, its ability to account for
the effects does not indicate that the findings on which it is based are
statistically significant.
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Literature on the economic effects of disasters concentrates on measures of direct and indirect effects. Direct effects are losses associated
with observable damage to property, production, and persons. Indirect
effects are costs of recovery and mitigation efforts. Indirect costs are
more difficult to observe but can be and have been well measured. This
chapter concerns itself with effects that arise through changes in expectations. Direct observation of expectations is generally either not
possible, too expensive, or not precise. Accordingly, expectations models must generate a number of implications that can provide indirect
validation of the underlying theory.
Three disaster expectations models are examined in this paper. First,
and most direct, is the effect of disaster expectations on local property
values and economic development. Particular attention is given to the
possibility that recent disaster experience changes local disaster expectations. This model implies that economic effects of disaster events are
based on the unanticipated component of disaster events, or on the difference between actual and expected disaster losses. Second, the effect
of disaster expectations on incentives to develop land is considered.
Using models taken from urban economics, it is possible to demonstrate circumstances under which private returns from development of
land in hazard-prone areas are less than social returns. Third, disaster
expectations of property owners should include not only direct damage
to their own assets but also the possibility of asset revaluation due to
the external effects of disasters on surrounding property. The findings
demonstrate that expectations regarding these external effects make
disaster insurance different from other forms of hazard insurance and
explain some puzzles about behavior of property owners in disasterprone areas.
The next four sections of the chapter discuss these three models
of disaster expectations (the direct effect of disaster expectations is
analyzed in two sections). The final section summarizes the major findings and develops implications of these models for understanding the
likely effects of changes in public policy toward natural and man-made
disasters.
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INDIVIDUAL AND MARKET RESPONSES TO
DISASTER EXPECTATIONS
There is ample evidence that disaster expectations are priced into
markets. The most obvious example is insurance against disaster events,
where pricing is based on sophisticated models of the likelihood that
events will occur and the estimate of damage, conditional on the event
happening. Those insurance companies that do not price insurance and
accumulate reserves using statistical models of disaster expectations do
not remain solvent for long and can generally be dismissed as curiosities that have no long-term importance.2
There is a strong argument that competitive pressures force most
firms to form and act upon efficient disaster expectations, because they
must purchase hazard insurance in order to secure capital investment.
However, the case for household responses to disaster expectations is
not so obvious. Indeed, there is evidence that households are reluctant
to purchase insurance against disaster events even when the insurance
is subsidized. Before discussing models that trace the effect of disasters
on the economy through their effect on disaster expectations, it is worth
reviewing the evidence on household responses to disaster expectations.
Because disasters are infrequent and difficult to forecast, households
will have difficulty forming expectations regarding their likelihood and
severity. However, the literature on individual responses to other large,
low-frequency hazards appears to conclude that the implied value of
life based on household mitigation behavior is consistent and not unreasonable.3 This suggests that households may have reasonable disaster
expectations. Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans (1985) find that households, confronted with different hazard insurance rates associated with
location within or near a floodplain, require a compensating differential
in housing prices to live in areas where the expected cost of flood damage is larger. MacDonald, Murdoch, and White (1987) carry the analysis
further by modeling the relation between house price discounts and the
discounted present value of future insurance payments and conclude
that, at reasonable discount rates, housing price differentials reflect differences in expected future insurance premiums.
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Thus far the evidence discussed deals with cases in which static
differences in disaster expectations influence household behavior.
Research has also been done on the effects of changes in disaster expectations due to the provision of expert information. Brookshire et al.
(1985) examined the effects on housing prices of the requirement that
home sellers in California reveal proximity of the housing unit to earthquake fault lines. The regulation was passed based on the belief that this
information was not available to buyers. The natural experiment, with
observations before and after the information and for houses in and out
of the fault areas, indicated that the proximity to the fault line affected
price after the announcement was made.4
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the economic effects of disaster information was the response to federal government
notices of earthquake hazards in the resort community of Mammoth
Lakes, California, from 1980 until 1984. The unique feature of this
incident was that the United States Geological Survey (USGS) recognized that making public announcements of changes in the probability
of seismic events could have serious consequences and implemented
an experimental design around the pronouncements. The USGS adopted a three-level index of potential hazard and, from 1980 to 1984,
announced seismic risks for Mammoth Lakes that began with the lowest and ended at the highest risk level. The results of this experiment,
as reported in a detailed study by Bernknopf, Brookshire, and Thayer
(1990), were dramatic. Surveys of the resident population showed that
there was a substantial increase in perceptions that a seismic event was
likely after each announcement of increasing risk. Recreational use of
the area did not fall. However, new construction and house values fell
significantly. The market response was so dramatic that the USGS decided to abandon its three-level seismic hazard announcement policy.5
Overall, there is substantial empirical evidence that firms and
households have significant market responses to information on the
likelihood of hazard events, whether that information is presented in
the form of insurance rates or government announcements. This should
not come as a surprise, and the economic effects of these reactions
are easily understood and consistent with economic efficiency. When
increased hazard expectations are capitalized into the asset price of
real property, construction in hazard-prone areas is discouraged and

Public Policy toward Natural and Man-Made Disasters 43

property owners have an incentive to adopt designs that mitigate the
likely damage should a disaster occur. All this is unsurprising and well
established in the literature. Indeed, there is nothing in the foregoing
discussion that distinguishes market reactions to disasters from the economics of hazards generally.

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
DISASTER EXPECTATIONS
Because disasters are infrequent, large, spatially concentrated, and
difficult to forecast, there is a possibility that disaster events change
disaster expectations, and, of course, that failure to experience disasters
changes expectations in the opposite direction. This is a distinguishing
characteristic of disasters.
Hazards that are not infrequent, large, spatially concentrated, or difficult to forecast have expectations that are not significantly influenced
by individual hazard events. The fact that a house in a neighborhood
burns down has zero effect on insurance models or public expectations
of fire damage hazards. This is true because home fires are frequent, impose modest losses, are not spatially concentrated, and can be forecast
with great precision. Individual occurrences of an event that is fairly
likely to happen have little effect on the expected probability of that
event.
Because disasters are infrequent and difficult to forecast, firms and
individuals should use recent history to update their expectations of the
stochastic process generating the disasters. This was very evident in the
reaction to hurricane losses in Florida during the 1990s when property
insurance companies raised rates or withdrew from the market, necessitating the formation of a government-sponsored Florida Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund. This is one of many examples in which it appears
evident that an increase in the frequency or extent of disaster events
causes insurance companies to modify stochastic models of disaster
loss and substantially raise insurance premiums. The natural presumption is that firms and households behave similarly and that in addition
to the direct and indirect effects of disasters, disaster events have an
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expectations effect due to the consequences of the modified estimates of
disaster losses. Such effects might well have negative implications for
recovery and growth of income, output, population, and so on.
There is contradictory evidence regarding the effect of disasters
on expectations based on the relation between disaster experience and
economic development. In a very influential statistical analysis of disaster events, Wright et al. (1979) concludes that the rates of growth are
higher after disasters than before and that long-run growth is higher in
areas that experience disaster events. An extensive literature has compared economic outcomes in areas with and without disaster events.
Most recently, Belasen and Polacheck (2008) apply a generalized difference in difference estimator to counties in Florida over the 1988 to
2005 period, when the state experienced 19 major storms. They find
that employment fell by about 4.8 percent and total earnings rose 4.4
percent in counties experiencing direct hits, while total earnings fell 4.5
percent in neighboring counties. These differences dissipate over time.
Studying international disasters, Cuaresma, Hlouskova, and Obersteiner
(2008) find evidence that countries with higher disaster rates experience higher rates of subsequent economic growth.6 Further evidence
presented by Worthington (2008) indicates that natural disaster events
have no significant effects on overall stock market returns. These and a
large number of other statistical studies of cross-section and panel data
on areas with and without disaster events tend to produce evidence that
disasters are not associated with significant negative effects on output,
earnings, and employment. One or more of these variables may decline,
but the type of general negative implication for economic growth that
would be expected from an upward revision in disaster expectations has
not been observed.
There is a parallel literature consisting of case studies conducted in
the aftermath of disasters. Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) contend that the
rush of aid in response to the great Alaskan earthquake of 1964 gave an
area in long-term decline a chance to reverse its falling employment.
Other case studies have reached similar conclusions. Recently Smith
et al. (2006) found that the recovery pattern from Hurricane Andrew
varied by income group, with the numbers of high- and low-income
households growing in the aftermath of the storm while the number of
middle-income households fell. While case studies of the aftermath of
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Katrina are not available yet, it appears certain that income, output, and
employment will not recover. Still, the general sense of the literature
reviewed above is that the answer to the question, “Are disasters bad
for economic growth?” could be “no” or at least “not necessarily.” This
leads to the subsequent question, “Is postdisaster relief too generous?”
There is a problem with both of these questions as well as the proposed answer. Understanding the problem and formulating an answer
will require development of a formal model of the likely effects of
changed disaster expectations on economic growth. The model begins
with an understanding of real estate values in an urban land market.
Because real estate is immobile, differences in future expectations for
regional economic activity tend to be capitalized in land and housing
values. There is a well-developed literature on quality of life stemming
from the work of Rosen (1974) and Roback (1982, 1988) that suggests
a relation among amenity, house prices, and wages in a labor market
area. Decreases in amenity are associated with increases in wages and
decreased house prices in order to keep households from leaving an
area. A rise in disaster expectations makes an area less attractive to both
firms and households. Under these circumstances the change in wages
is ambiguous because there is a spatial no-arbitrage condition for firms
based on profits and for households based on indirect utility.7 However,
the theory unambiguously predicts that land and real estate prices will
fall in response to an increase in disaster expectations.
Rubin and Yezer (1987) provide a general empirical test of the relation between disaster events and local economic activity by examining
the change in house prices in areas experiencing different numbers of
disasters. For a panel of U.S. cities in 1983, they analyzed the partial
effect on the asset prices of housing, as reported in the American Housing Survey for a cross-section of cities, in relation to differences in the
number of disaster events during the previous 20 years.8 The estimated
coefficient of disasters was positive, and its magnitude implied that going from an annual disaster rate of zero to one increased the value of
owner-occupied housing in the city by 26 percent.9 The authors point
out that such an interpretation of the estimated coefficient of disasters is
absurd, and they argue from these results that something is very wrong
with models that relate the incidence of disaster events to local economic development.
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The literature has documented the effects of information from insurance pricing, scientific evidence, and government pronouncements
on disaster expectations. It is much more difficult to determine the effect of disasters themselves on disaster expectations. This is perhaps the
most underresearched aspect of the economics of disasters. A disaster
event might lower, raise, or leave unchanged disaster expectations of a
rational agent, depending on the nature of the disaster. Some seismic
events occur periodically and, given the slow pace of geologic time,
an eruption today may mean that the next eruption is hundreds of years
in the future. Alternatively, recent storm damage may lead individuals
to expect that the underlying frequency of storms has increased due to
global climate change.
This paper is particularly concerned with the case in which, given
the complexity or lack of information on the process generating the
disaster, agents update their expectations of the frequency distribution
of disasters based on a comparison of recent disaster experience with
the historical record. Such updating may occur for two reasons. First,
individuals may believe that the disaster-generating process varies over
time and may be trying to estimate the parameters of a stochastic process
with drift.10 Alternatively, they may believe that disasters are generated
by a stationary stochastic process and simply use recent experience to
improve their estimates of the parameters of that distribution. Because
this second case is easier to describe and has been analyzed in the literature, it will be considered in some detail here.
In considering the case of a stable stochastic process, the Poisson
process is quite attractive because it requires individuals to estimate a
single parameter, and the probability of a disaster event is independent
of the time since the last disaster. Cox and Lewis (1966) first suggested
fitting the Poisson process to disaster events, and Brown (1972) adapted
it to the case of flooding. Analysis of Bayesian updating of expectations regarding the Poisson process is mercifully simple. The process
is based on a single parameter: the expected disaster frequency, f. The
expected time between disasters, T, is the reciprocal of f; that is, T =
1/f. Assume that the historical record available at time t indicates that
α disasters were observed over the previous τ years. Then the estimate
of f at time t is simply the ratio ft = α / τ. Now assume that, in the next
X years, β additional disasters occur. Then the Bayesian estimate of f at
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time t + X is ft + X = (α + β) / (τ + X). The change in estimated disaster
frequency between t and t + X is given by

f  f  x  f   [(   ) /(  X)]  [ /  ]
 [ /(  X)]  [ /(  X)](X /  )
 [   (X /  )]/(  X).
This final expression has a very intuitive interpretation. The change
in expected disaster frequency is equal to the difference between actual
disaster experience during the recent period of X years, β, and expected
number of disasters based on the previous τ years, α(X / τ), divided by
the total number of years under consideration, X + τ. Thus this change
represents the difference between actual and expected disasters per year
of disaster history available to the individual making the estimate.
Rubin and Yezer (1987) discuss whether the difference between actual and expected disasters could help explain the more rapid increase
in house prices in cities that had more disasters. Dividing the 20-year
period over which presidential disaster declarations were observed in
their cross-section of cities into a 16-year “history” that served as the
basis for estimates of disaster expectations and a subsequent 4 years of
recent experience, they computed the difference between the number of
actual and expected disasters in the recent period and reestimated the
model of house price change discussed above. The disaster rate for the
entire period still had a positive sign, but the difference between actual
and expected disasters (i.e., the number of unexpected disasters) had a
substantial negative effect on house values.
How should these results be interpreted? It appears that during this
period, cities where disaster expectations were higher were growing
faster than those where disaster expectations were lower. Given that cities with higher disaster expectations have more disasters, this produced
a positive association between house price growth and the disaster rate.
This association is of no particular significance unless there is further
evidence that the growth of cities in areas with higher disaster rates is
being subsidized. Put another way, the literature on the relation between
area economic growth and disaster frequency does not reveal the effects
of disasters on growth because most disasters are anticipated. Develop-
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ment takes place in high-disaster areas only in anticipation of future
damage, and that expected damage is part of the cost of doing business
in those areas. “What is the effect of disasters on economic growth?”
is a vexed question. The appropriate question is, “What is the effect of
unanticipated disasters on economic growth?”
The effect of unanticipated disasters on house values found by
Rubin and Yezer (1987) is substantial. Consider an area that had no
previous disaster experience and then had one disaster during the fouryear event window; that is, it had one unanticipated disaster. This would
lower house values by 2 percent. This change may not seem large; however, in a city with 500,000 housing units with an average value of
$200,000, the change in expectations due to the single unanticipated
disaster event lowers total house values by $2 billion! This is only one
example of how the effects of unanticipated disasters can be large compared to the direct damage and indirect recovery costs.
The implications for public policy of these substantial effects on
local economies of changes in disaster expectations based on disaster events will be discussed in some detail in a subsequent section. It
should be clear that disasters that have the same direct and indirect effects in terms of damages to property, income, output, and individuals
have very different long-term local effects depending on the extent to
which they were anticipated. Furthermore, while it is possible, at least
in theory if not in practice, to insure against direct and even some indirect losses due to disaster events, insuring against losses due to changed
expectations is impossible. Indeed, it is likely that firms and households
in areas with high disaster expectations are well insured against direct
and indirect losses, whereas those in areas where expectations are low
are unlikely to insure against these insurable losses. Thus the overall
uninsured losses from unanticipated disasters are likely to be very large.
It should also be obvious that the economic effects of man-made disasters, particularly acts of terrorism, are best understood in terms of
changes in expectations.11 Other things being equal, those terrorist acts
that produce damages of a type or in a location where expectations were
low have the largest economic effects. These considerations will prove
very important in the discussion of policy implications.
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Disaster Expectations and Efficient Land Use and Mitigation
Most of the literature on disaster expectations and efficient economic development deals with excess development and insufficient
mitigation efforts in areas where disaster frequencies are high. This
problem has been the object of congressional testimony and reports as
well as academic inquiry.12 Once disaster relief became a regular and
mandated part of federal policy, there was an incentive for states, localities, and individuals to self-insure development in hazardous areas.
The normal disincentives to such development—namely, the prospect
of loss and the cost of insurance—were mitigated by the prospect of
postdisaster relief.13 Concern over this problem has led to a number
of initiatives, including the National Flood Insurance Program, which
dealt with excess development and inadequate mitigation by combining
disaster relief provisions with mandatory insurance and design requirements. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 promoted state
and local planning efforts to control and direct development, and the
Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982 attempted to deter development
by cutting off federal funding to designated areas that had high disaster
probability and environmental sensitivity.
The general sense of the literature appears to be that government
policy for disaster relief is subject to the Samaritan’s dilemma: these
efforts create major problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and
time inconsistency that encourage development and discourage mitigation in disaster-prone areas.14 Mandatory insurance, design controls,
mandatory mitigation, and even designation of areas in which government assistance will not be provided are generally seen as the proper
response to the distortions produced by disaster relief programs.
This section focuses on an issue that has attracted negligible interest in the literature: spatial land market models suggesting that there is
too little development in areas where disaster expectations are high. The
overdevelopment literature discussed above tends to ignore issues of
space and location that are governed by the functioning of the land market. Because land subject to high disaster risk is spatially concentrated,
the development of significant areas is contingent on the treatment of
disaster losses. Frame (1998, 2001) has considered this issue explicitly,
as follows. Take the land market in a standard urban model in which
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land at a particular location has special value based on unique locational
advantages, such as the central business district of a city or a shoreline
location. For simplicity’s sake call this the high-productivity area. Land
rents will peak at such points and decline with distance. What happens
if some of the land at or near the peak of this land rent surface is not
developed because it is subject to flooding or some other hazard that
would inflict substantial damage on real property? Frame demonstrates
that this undeveloped land yields a general loss of community welfare
because the area as a whole is less efficient at providing developed sites
with access to the high-productivity area. This result holds even if the
high-hazard area does not impede through access; for example, if the
area lacks housing but highways can be built through it to transport
workers or consumers from distant points to the high-productivity area.
More recently Liu (2008) has examined the relation between the
private and social returns from developing land in and around highproductivity areas. The private gain from developing land in hazardous
areas is the difference in value between undeveloped and developed
land. Part of the development process is the opportunity for mitigation,
and the assumption is that insurance markets are available or that developers are risk-neutral. His results are quite intuitive. If there are no
externalities associated with the functioning of a perfectly competitive
land market, private benefit from development of land subject to hazards is equal to the social benefit, and private land market allocations are
socially efficient. However, if there are externalities in the operation of
the land market, particularly problems of traffic congestion, social benefit can be significantly larger than private benefit. Using a numerical
urban simulation model with congestion calibrated to Kansas City, Liu
finds that the social value of development near central city areas is approximately twice the private benefit realized by the land owner.15 This
means that land subject to hazards could have too little development.
McDonald (2009), in a similar model calibrated to Chicago, confirms
the general result that, in the presence of congestion, private benefits to
development of land near the central business district are significantly
below social benefits. While he does not relate these results to effects of
hazards, the arguments made here would hold in his model also.16
Nothing in this discussion of the land market models and the possibility of underdevelopment of high disaster risk areas should be seen
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as a contradiction of the literature on incentives for excess development
due to moral hazard arising from federal disaster relief programs.17
However, land market efficiency considerations do suggest that, in
some circumstances, there are countervailing forces that tend to restrict
development below optimal levels in areas that are prone to disasters.
Accordingly, such areas should be given careful attention to determine
which of the conflicting forces is larger.
Disaster Expectations, External Effects, and Disaster Insurance
One puzzle in the disaster literature involves the reluctance of
households in high-risk areas to purchase insurance even if the price
appears to be below expected losses. The failure to use subsidized insurance has troubled many observers. Kunreuther (1978) noted that,
in the first four years of the National Flood Insurance Program (1968–
1972), only 3,000 of 21,000 eligible communities with substantial
flooding history participated in the program, and fewer than 300,000
homeowners voluntarily purchased a policy. Even though the NFIP was
subsidized, participation was initially achieved only by threatening to
withhold federally assisted or guaranteed construction from nonparticipating communities, and by denying mortgage loans to property owners
in nonparticipating communities that were identified as special flood
hazard areas.18 Palm et al. (1990) documented a similar failure of homeowners and mortgage lenders to seek earthquake insurance in high-risk
areas. Kunreuther and Kleffner (1992) and Kunreuther (1996) have
even argued that homeowners do not behave as if they are maximizing
expected utility in their decisions to purchase insurance or engage in
private mitigation efforts.
The discussion of disaster insurance is generally conducted using
models standard in the insurance literature. A household owns an asset
whose current value is A which is subject to expected damages of DA
so that its expected value in the next period is A − DA with variance VD.
The variance in A − DA is due to the possibility that the hazard event
might occur during the current time period. Given that the expected
value of damage due to the hazard is generally known to be DA, the
household can purchase hazard insurance at a price of DA + F, where
F is the normal fee associated with providing this insurance product

52 Yezer

under perfect competition. Households have a choice of purchasing full
insurance or no insurance. What are the consequences for wealth in the
next period? Expected wealth under full insurance is A − (DA + F), with
certainty compared to expected wealth of A − DA with variance VD without insurance. Insurance reduces the variance in return to zero because
the insurance payment is perfectly correlated with the damage to asset
value. Households that are moderately risk averse will choose insurance, and there is no reason to assume that households owning property
in disaster-prone areas are not moderately risk averse.19 This line of
argument has treated disaster risk the same as other risks to property,
such as fire, liability, collision, or theft.
One distinguishing characteristic of disasters, as defined in this essay, is the extent and spatial concentration of damage. In terms of the
simple example above, any damage to asset value A is likely associated
with damage experienced by the full alphabet of asset values owned by
other households in the area. In this case, the fall in wealth experienced
by the household is equal to A − (DA + EA ), where EA is the external effect of disaster damage to other properties in the area on the value of the
asset. Assume that VE and rED are the variance of E and the correlation
between E and D respectively. A household that purchases insurance
has expected wealth of A − (DA + F + EA ) with variance VE , and the
household that self-insures has expected wealth of A − (DA+ EA ) and
variance of (VD + VE )/2 + rED (VEVD )0.5. The variance in second-period
wealth of those who purchase insurance depends crucially on rED. Consider the stylized but not unreasonable case in which VD is equal to VE
and rED equals one, so that the external damage is perfectly correlated
with the damage to the structure. Then the variance becomes 2VD and
the risk of self-insuring has doubled. In this case, the household has the
choice between two risky alternatives but, again abstracting for other
opportunities for risk diversification, the moderately risk-averse household is likely to have a risk premium greater than F and will choose to
purchase insurance. Now consider the other extreme, in which VD is
equal to VE and rED equals −1. The household that self-insures has expected second-period wealth of A − (DA + EA ) and variance of zero. This
household thus will rationally self-insure unless insurance is heavily
subsidized. Indeed, there is a separating equilibrium for rED sufficiently
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small that even very risk-averse households switch from buying to not
buying insurance.
The incentive to purchase insurance and the effects of mandatory
insurance depend on the relative sizes of DA and EA and particularly on
the sign and size of rED. Given that the indirect effects of disasters take
the form of a local public good, it may appear that this correlation is
positive and close to one. However, one line of argument suggests rED
is negative. If a structure is damaged but the damage is less than that of
surrounding structures, then the rental price of its services may well rise
because the disaster reduces the supply of real property for a significant
period after the event. Furthermore, the reduction in real property may
be permanent.
Perhaps the most obvious case for a negative rED is that of beach
property located in the third or fourth row of homes from the shoreline.
In most beach communities, there is a sharp decline in value as distance
from the shoreline increases: that is, value varies inversely with row. In
storm events, most damage is experienced by the first and second rows.
In some cases, the first row cannot be rebuilt due to shoreline erosion,
and each subsequent row then moves up the value gradient. Put another
way, the third row is one large hurricane away from being beachfront
property.
This simple model illustrates that, if there are significant external
effects that are negatively correlated with private damages, the effect of
insurance on economic development becomes rather complex. As noted
above, many property owners will fail to insure even if insurance pricing is based on shared expectations of future damages. The provision of
such insurance benefits those owners whose expected external effects
are either small or positively correlated with private damages. It does
not benefit owners with large external effects that are negatively correlated with damages. Therefore, mandating disaster insurance for all
property owners imposes net costs on owners of properties with significant external effects that are negatively correlated with damages. This
leads to the surprising result that mandatory purchase requirements for
insurance that is priced based on expected damages distorts asset prices
and property development by lowering asset prices for properties with
large external effects that are negatively correlated with damages.
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The example noted of beach property in different rows may offer a
test of the theoretical arguments made above. The nature of external effects should vary significantly with distance from the shoreline. Given
that the hazard is storm damage by wind and waves, it is likely that
private damage in the first row will be much larger than any external
effects and that external effects will be positively correlated with damages.20 Moving back to the second and third rows of property, these
relative effects are likely to be reversed. Shoreline erosion may imperil
the first row, but it simply makes inland areas more proximate to the
beach. Damages to interior areas are very likely to be smaller than in
the first row. Overall it appears that shoreline areas provide an excellent
natural experiment to assess the varying importance of private damages
versus external effects for economic activity.
The difficulty with testing the effects of private damage and external
effects on investment in beach property is that the test requires differentiating among rows of beach development: that is, the geographic
scale is very small. Testing for insurance effects is further complicated
because the current NFIP has been in place in most beach communities
since the mid-1980s, so insurance coverage has not varied significantly
in recent years. The most direct way to measure effects of insurance
coverage is to look for capitalization in asset prices by monitoring the
variation in house values by row and over time. Some research on the
effects of government policy on beachfront residential development
has been done using hedonic house value equations (Keeler, Kriesel,
and Landry 2003), repeat sale house price indexes (Cordes, Gatzlaff,
and Yezer 2001), and building permits issued (Cordes and Yezer 1998).
Unfortunately, none of these techniques is suitable for tracking development effects on shoreline property based on distance in feet from the
water’s edge in beach communities over the period extending from before the NFIP through its current form. Such an analysis would require
price or permit data going back to 1968 differentiated by row from the
shoreline. No such data are available.
Cordes, Yezer, and Asadurian (2008) found another way to test
for the differential effects of flood insurance by row from the beachfront. Property records include the number of square feet of interior
space of dwellings and the date that the housing was built. Using aerial
photographic maps, they were able to divide beach developments into
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rectangles corresponding to development rows whose land area is fixed
and measurable. Using building records that gave the number of square
feet of interior space in each dwelling in a rectangle, it was possible to
construct a time series going back to 1968 of the square feet of interior
space per square foot of land area, commonly known as the “floor/area
ratio.” The result of this effort was a 40-year time series of the capital/
land ratio in each rectangle for the period from 1968 to 1997. The maps
also facilitated calculation of distance of each row from the water’s
edge and, together with information on erosion rates, this allowed computation of estimated time until erosion undermined the structures in a
given rectangle.21
Each beachfront community entered into the NFIP in two stages.
First it entered the emergency program, where flood insurance was
heavily subsidized, and then, after completion of a flood insurance map
(FIRM), it entered the regular program, in which insurance subsidies
for new construction were much smaller or nonexistent.22 Given that
the various communities entered these two phases in different years,
the data include observations of communities with and without each
of the programs in any given year as well as before and after information for each community. The estimation results demonstrated that
entering both the emergency and regular NFIP had the effect of tilting
real property development toward the shoreline. The rate of growth in
density, measured as floor/area ratio, increased the most in the first row,
but this positive effect fell off rapidly, reaching zero at a distance of
350 feet from the water’s edge. The effect was large, statistically significant, and congruent with the theoretical prediction that programs
mandating insurance encourage development in areas where the external effects of hazards are negligible or positively correlated with the
private damage—the first rows of shoreline development. At the same
time, mandatory insurance programs discourage development in areas
where the external effects of hazards are large or negatively correlated
with private damage—rows located inland.
Thus it appears that the existence of expectations that disasters
are associated with both private damage and external effects creates
the paradoxical possibility that mandating universal purchase of insurance based on expected private damage estimates distorts the location
of economic activity toward areas where expected hazard losses are
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higher. While this may appear counterintuitive, it does explain the difficulty in getting some households in high-risk areas to participate in
the NFIP.

IMPLICATIONS OF DISASTER EXPECTATIONS
FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Formal models of the economic effects of natural and man-made
disasters should include careful modeling of expectations, because
the prior level of disaster expectations, and any resulting changes in
the expectations, are very important determinants of those economic
effects. This essay has developed some of the pathways relating expectations and economic effects, but other important linkages in need of
research may exist. Nevertheless, the analysis presented here is sufficient to demonstrate some important principles whose implications for
public policy toward disasters will be discussed, including the effects
of changed disaster expectations, efficient land use considerations, and
potential distortions due to mandated insurance and mitigation.
Changes in Disaster Expectations
The economic effects of disasters depend on the relation between
prior expectations and actual disaster experience. This is illustrated in
the literature on the effects of earthquakes on property values and disaster expectations. Beron et al. (1997) find that property values near
fault lines actually rose after the Loma Prieta earthquake and argue that
prior expectations were too high. In contrast, Naoi, Seko, and Sumita
(2009) report that for earthquakes in Japan, surveys show that quake
expectations double after an event and property values fall significantly.
If actual disasters reflect disaster expectations, then those expectations
will be unchanged and negative expectations’ effects on economic development should be minor. The economic effects of a disaster depend
not only on how much damage it does but also the extent to which the
disaster event and the associated damage were anticipated. Furthermore,
it is not possible for firms and households to insure against the eco-
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nomic losses associated with changed expectations after unanticipated
disasters. What does this imply for public policy? First, it suggests that
insurance markets are inherently incomplete and that there is a role for
postdisaster aid. However, the aid should be focused on areas experiencing unanticipated disaster events.
While such selective targeting of disaster relief to unanticipated disasters is likely politically impossible, some elements of disaster relief
policy seem consistent with a focus on events that raise expectations.
First, there is a scale effect in disaster declarations, so larger disasters
get proportionally greater postdisaster compensation.23 To the extent
that unusually large disaster events are unanticipated, making federal
participation a nonlinear function of the size of the aggregate losses is
appropriate. Furthermore, NFIP aid diminishes for repeated flooding
events. The subsidized insurance for grandfathered structures can be
withdrawn after repeated losses. Finally, the amount of publicity and
attention given to disaster events may decrease to the extent that the
event is regular and anticipated. This may lower the amount of public
and private aid following such events. Certainly, more could be done
with formal policies toward postdisaster aid to concentrate public funds
on unanticipated disaster events, but in this case political expediency
likely will triumph over economic logic.
Another implication of the losses associated with unanticipated
disasters is that terrorists who wish to inflict maximum total damage
for a given amount of physical damage will concentrate their actions
where damage is not anticipated. There are many other considerations in
selecting targets, but areas where disaster expectations are low have two
advantages. First, victims will likely not be taking precautions. This
makes success in inflicting damage more likely, and perhaps also lowers
the probability of apprehension and sanction if that is a consideration.
Second, the unexpected component of the disaster event is largest in
areas where prior expectations are lowest. In this case the implications
for public policy are clear and, fortunately, the politically expedient
course does not tend toward moral hazard. Provision of generous relief
from damages lowers the expectation of loss from man-made disasters.
This lowers the economic effects because the economic reaction will
depend both on the change in expectations of the probability of loss and
on the expectation of the size of loss conditional on the act taking place.
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Relief can do nothing about the change in probability, but it can lower
the conditional expectation of loss and hence the economic effects produced by the change in expectations.24
Incentives for Efficient Land Use and Mitigation
The moral hazard and time inconsistency problems associated with
federal provision of disaster relief are well understood.25 Indeed, the
cornerstone of disaster policy since the passage of NFIP has been to resolve the Samaritan’s dilemma by forcing those developing property in
hazardous areas to face an insurance price that reflects expected future
losses and required mitigation to control those losses. Insurance and
mitigation costs, in turn, discourage development.
Because hazards are spatially concentrated, public policy toward
disasters has an important effect on when and how densely significant
tracts of land are developed. When this issue is considered in terms of a
continuous land market model, it is important that the private incentives
to develop land in hazardous areas be consistent with the social benefits
from such development. If land is homogenous, private benefit equals
social benefit and private landlords should develop land only when the
private returns to development are sufficient to compensate for the cost
of development, including any expected disaster losses. However, all
land is not homogenous, and there may well be externalities associated
with land development, particularly in an urban setting where accessibility is important and transportation systems are congested. Under
such circumstances the social benefit from developing sites may exceed
the private benefit, and landlords may fail to develop land or may do so
at a density that is below the social optimum. In these circumstances,
public action to subsidize mitigation or insurance can be justified.
There are many examples of public policy efforts to subsidize
development of hazard-prone land in an urban context. Many communities have used general public funding for flood control and land
reclamation efforts.26 The arguments made in this essay suggest that
there is an economic rationale for these actions and that public subsidy
calls for a demonstration of social benefits in excess of private benefits.
In cases where subsidized mitigation is not feasible or not economical,
provision of subsidized insurance can also align private and social ben-
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efits from development. Such policies must be implemented with some
care, because political abuse by subsidizing development where there is
no externality is also possible.
External Effects and Disaster Insurance
Because disaster effects are spatially concentrated, the usual insurance model should be applied cautiously in developing the economic
effects of disaster insurance. When disaster strikes, owners of property suffer private damage and insurance compensates for those losses.
Insurance is also available for some of the disruption following the
disaster—that is, for the indirect effects of the disaster. It is easy to construct an argument for mandatory participation in an actuarially sound
disaster insurance program, particularly when the government is committed to providing relief services.
This argument ignores external effects of disasters on asset prices
in an area. One can easily identify situations in which these external effects are positive and offset the private losses. This explains why some
property owners in hazardous areas rationally fail to purchase hazard
insurance, even when the insurance is subsidized. Public policies that
mandate purchase of actuarially fair insurance in such cases will distort
the pattern of economic development toward areas where expected private losses are high compared to any external effects. These may well
be the areas where disaster damage expectations are highest. The end
result could be to encourage the movement of economic development
into harm’s way.
This does not mean that it is necessary to abandon public policies
of mandating the purchase of disaster insurance. It does suggest that
the case for mandating purchase should be very strong. In such cases,
it should be possible to provide insurance at rates that are higher than
actuarially fair in areas where external effects are positively correlated
with private losses and at a discount to fair rates where external effects
are negatively correlated with private losses. Identification of these
areas need not involve substantial economic analysis: they should be
apparent based on patterns of participation in voluntary insurance programs or even in our current “mandated” programs by observing areas
where actual participation rates are either very high or very low.
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Overall, models that integrate expectations of natural and manmade disasters into the body of economic theory suggest that public
policy toward these events needs to be carefully considered. The great
difficulty facing the federal government is the general presumption that
programs and policies need to be nationally uniform. Considerations of
economic efficiency appear to run counter to this presumption.

Notes
1. There is currently a national need to understand the effects of terrorist events. In
the absence of the ability to extend results from other types of disasters to terrorism, this understanding would have to wait for a significant number of terrorist
incidents to accumulate to provide a database suitable for testing. This is not a
happy prospect.
2. This is not to say that the consequences of failure to price risk correctly are uninteresting or unimportant. Surely the credit default insurance industry of the past
decade has had large negative economic effects, and so the “solution” to risk can
itself result in a disaster event if that solution is unsound. These issues are beyond
the scope of this paper, which assumes that insurance pricing is based on the latest
and best estimates of risk.
3. See, for example, the recent discussion by Hakes and Viscusi (2007).
4. In this case proximity to a fault line was not indicated by insurance rates in ways
that would make it apparent to home buyers. Indeed, the provision of earthquake
insurance in California has been problematic for some time now for reasons that
would easily justify an essay of considerable length.
5. The subsequent absence of a seismic event of any size proved embarrassing to the
USGS, and there were threats of litigation by property owners.
6. The conclusion is somewhat more nuanced, as the authors find that the higher growth
rate postdisaster depends on the initial economic circumstances of the country.
7. A rise in disaster expectations lowers expected profits or raises insurance costs for
firms, which then require compensation in the form of lower wages and/or lower
rents. The same rise lowers indirect utility of households, and they require compensation in the form of higher wages and/or lower rents. The change in wages is
ambiguous but rents, and hence property values, must fall.
8. Specifically, they estimated a standard hedonic model for the logarithm of house
value explained by a variety of housing characteristics standard in the literature but
with area disasters added.
9. A disaster event is defined as one that resulted in a presidential disaster declaration. The disaster variable is the number of disaster declarations in the previous 15
years divided by 15 to produce an annual rate.
10. Recent attention to climate change may lead individuals to believe that the frequency of disasters is changing. Whether this belief is scientifically valid or not,
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11.

12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

20.
21.

22.

those who hold it will be updating based on an underlying stochastic model that
allows for drift. Further research on this possibility is warranted.
These statements are based on an implicit model in which the supply of terrorist
acts is elastic. Models with a fixed supply of terrorist events, such as those described in Barker (2003), may result in different implications than those discussed
in this paper.
For an extensive discussion see Congressional Research Service (1992).
See, for example, the analysis in Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans (1985).
Moral hazard arises in the form of the Samaritan’s dilemma. Individuals fail to
insure or mitigate because they expect government postdisaster relief. Adverse
selection problems occur if individuals with unrealistic expectations for disaster
probabilities selectively migrate to hazardous areas. The time inconsistency problem arises when individuals believe that, by moving to a hazardous area, they
can prompt public expenditures to mitigate the hazard by governments anxious to
conserve on disaster relief cost. In other words, move onto the floodplain and the
government will be forced to build a dam or levee at public expense.
Congestion in commuting is endogenous in this model. Given highway capacity,
the model generates congestion based on the number of individuals choosing to
commute through a particular segment of the city.
Chicago presents an interesting historical case because the portion of the city north
of Lake Street is built on fill land that was created to realize the high social return
of filling in the shore of Lake Michigan.
In addition to the standard arguments about excess development in high-risk areas already discussed, there is a more general literature on excess investment in
real property, particularly second homes, based on the tax preference for owneroccupied housing; see Poterba and Sinai (2008).
While the subsidy component of NFIP insurance for new construction is not large,
the subsidy for existing units built before the insurance was implemented is very
large. Furthermore, lenders are required to check for flood insurance in connection with mortgage servicing. Kriesel and Landry (2004) report survey evidence
indicating that the participation rate is only 49 percent in spite of the mandate that
mortgage servicers require evidence of insurance in force.
Evidence for the degree of risk aversion could be gleaned from portfolio behavior
of households based on property ownership. It has been argued that perception of
risk from hazards is selectively faulty or that households owning property in areas
with high disaster probability are selected to be those who systematically underestimate the hazard.
Damages in interior areas may impede recovery and repair in shoreline areas as
well as raise the cost of these activities.
Obviously, beach erosion can sometimes be zero or even negative, i.e., the beach is
accreting. In such cases estimated erosion time is infinite. The areas considered in
this study are all beaches and subject to erosion. They are not protected by natural
or man-made barriers. The potential for storm damage is substantial in these areas.
New construction was also subject to special construction requirements designed
to raise vulnerable structures above flood surge levels.
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23. Note that there is an element of size needed even to qualify for a presidential disaster declaration.
24. To the extent that the object of terrorism is to produce the greatest economic dislocation possible through the expectations effect, lowering the expectations effect
reduces the returns to terrorism.
25. For an early discussion of these issues along with an estimate of the wealth redistribution effects of the NFIP, see Shilling, Sirmans, and Benjamin (1989).
26. The reclaimed land is then sold back to the private sector at a loss. Policy toward
urban brownfields follows a similar pattern.
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4
The Economics of Disaster
Retrospect and Prospect
Hal Cochrane
Colorado State University

In preparing this chapter, I initially wrote that the economics of
hazards and disaster is a subfield of environmental economics. Upon reflection, I crossed that out, replacing it with “the economics of hazards
is a subfield of no less than five major fields, including behavioral economics, finance, regional economics, public finance, and environmental
economics.” This of course made the retrospective a bit daunting, especially for a chapter of this length. So, in looking back over the last 40
years, I culled a few key ideas that were influential in shaping disaster
research over this formative period.
When it came to providing a prospective view, I took the easy path.
I limited my coverage to the field that has absorbed my efforts over the
past 30 years: that is, the regional and national economic consequences
of disaster.

SOME HISTORY
The beginnings of this field can be traced back as far as John Stuart
Mill, who, I am embarrassed to admit, preempted much of what I will
present in the second half of the paper. Nearly 150 years ago Mill remarked about the economics of disaster, commenting on “what has so
often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries recover
from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all
traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the
ravages of war” (quoted in Hirshleifer 1987, p. 79).
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Almost a century later, John Kenneth Galbraith corroborated Mill’s
observations. As director of the Strategic Bombing Survey, Galbraith
investigated the impact of Allied bombing raids on the German war
machine. The survey concluded that the raids had had little impact.
Hamburg recovered nearly 80 percent of its productive capacity within
several months after a series of devastating attacks. The bombing raids
virtually decimated the city’s infrastructure, killed nearly 40,000 people
and destroyed 50 percent of the city’s buildings (Hirshleifer 1987). Despite these losses, production was only modestly affected.
These early roots provide a glimpse of the field’s beginnings. However, it wasn’t until the 1960s that four publications helped launch the
field: The Economics of Natural Disasters: Implications for Federal
Policy (Dacy and Kunreuther 1969), Design of Water-Resource Systems (Maass et al. 1962), A Unified National Program for Managing
Flood Losses (U.S. Congress 1966), and “Losses from Natural Hazards” (Russell 1970). Dacy and Kunreuther provided key insights into
the economic consequences of disasters (in this case the 1964 Alaskan
earthquake). Design of Water-Resource Systems set down the procedures for conducting benefit-cost studies of water projects. A Unified
National Program for Managing Flood Losses encouraged the adoption of a wider range of flood mitigation measures (at least wider than
the system of levees and reservoirs the Corps of Engineers had promoted prior to that time) and introduced the idea that flood insurance
might serve as a mechanism to promote an efficient means of coping
with flood hazards. The word might is emphasized since the document
was wary about insurance, for it was pointed out that an improperly
structured insurance program could make things worse. These three
publications provided enough starter material to employ a (very) small
army of economists for the next 40 years.
From what I gather, Cliff Russell’s classic “Losses from Natural
Hazards” grew out of his association with the Harvard Water Resources
Program and his collaboration with Bob Kates. This association was
key since Bob Kates, Gilbert White, and Ian Burton are widely recognized as the field’s pioneers. Russell’s piece served to convert the
basics of water resource economics into the economics of hazard management. In short, he showed that protection from natural events should
be adopted so long as the expected marginal benefit (the loss avoided
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due to protection) exceeded the expected marginal cost of that protection. In hindsight this is not a startling finding, and a direct line can be
drawn back to Harvard, particularly the work of Arthur Maass, Maynard M. Hufschmidt, Robert Dorfman, Harold A. Thomas Jr., Stephan
A. Marglin, and Gordon Maskew Fair. Despite its simplicity, the idea
proved to be a powerful reminder that hazards management involves a
balance between costs and losses.
It could be said that Russell’s work was foreshadowed by two earlier papers, one by Lester Lave (1963) and the other by Richard Nelson
and Sidney Winter (1964). Although their work did not address hazards in the way that Russell did, the framework developed served as a
foundation for later work in managing a wide range of hazards. There
is of course much more to the story. But a recurring theme in all these
works is the interplay of costs and losses, either objective or perceived.
The retrospective segment of the paper will thus focus on a few key
ideas that grew out of this early body of work. The second part, the prospective view, will concentrate on new avenues of research involving
disaster loss. This, in my view, is perhaps the most important yet least
understood aspect of the problem.

RETROSPECT
As indicated earlier, there is a vast body of literature to plow through
in order to come up with a set of key ideas. Much of what I am about
to present is based on the works of Lave (1963), Nelson and Winter
(1964), and Howe and Cochrane (1976). All three investigate whether
to mitigate losses from a potentially damaging event. They conclude
(as did Russell) that the interplay of event probabilities and subsequent
consequences shapes that choice. The framework about to be presented
draws upon a highly stylized example, one where floods are of a dichotomous nature, and costs, losses, and event probabilities are well known.
The presentation assesses the merits of taking action (or not) in view
of a short-term flood forecast. It then entertains the possibility that it
might be economically advantageous to adopt a more permanent flood
mitigation strategy, one that is tied to the probability of flooding alone,
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ignoring forecasts altogether. Finally, the framework is tweaked to address very long-run changes in climate.
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the power of these
simple models. Although not very complex, nor pathbreaking, they offer policymakers valuable insights into how to value meteorological
forecasts and even climate change research.
The Value of Forecasts
Should one heed a flood forecast? The answer to this question hinges
on the cost of doing something, the loss incurred if a flood occurs (and
insufficient protection is afforded), the climatological record, and the
accuracy of the forecast. To illustrate, let’s begin by characterizing
flooding as a dichotomous event: it either occurs or it doesn’t (Figure
4.1). Four combinations of flood forecasts and events are shown in Figure 4.1. When forecasts are perfect, P3 and P4 equal zero. But forecasts
may be in error; predicted floods fail to materialize, and unpredicted
Figure 4.1 Decision to Adopt Forecast-Sensitive Protection
Probabilities

Flood

Flood forecast
No

P1

P2

Yes

P3

P4

Consequences

Flood

Flood forecast
No

0

Cshort-run

Yes

Loss

Loss,
Cshort-run

NOTE: Adopt short-run protection if Cshort-run × (P2 + P4) + Loss × P3 < Loss × (P3 + P4).
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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floods occur. The situation can be visualized as one where sandbags
can be added to the levee provided that sufficient lead time is afforded.
Whether such a forecast should be used hinges on the expected sum of
costs and losses. It makes economic sense to adopt protection and use
the forecast if the expected cost of sandbagging, C(P2 + P4), is less than
the expected loss, L(P3 + P4).
The Value of Long-Term Protection
One might wonder whether there is a better way to deal with the
hazard; a more permanent form of protection might be more efficient.
In this case flood forecasts are disregarded in favor of probabilities
dictated by the climate. Here the cost of protection is certain and the
expected loss is the probability of flooding times loss. Note that these
losses and costs are likely to be different from those shown in Figure
4.1, but the interplay of cost and loss is key to adopting protection nonetheless: that is, adopt long-run protection if Clong-run < L(P3 + P4).
A Simple but Powerful Way of Conceptualizing the
Hazard Problem
This highly simplistic framework provides some very useful insights into the value of information. One is that it is not always wise
to act on a forecast. Errors might be too costly, and doing nothing may
be the most economical path. This point is easily demonstrated by asking what a hail forecast is worth to a wheat farmer. Since there are no
technically feasible ways of protecting the crop from damage, it follows
that the forecast would be worthless (perhaps less than worthless since
the farmer would worry about the fate of the crop). The framework also
raises the issue of perceptions versus objective measures. If the decision
maker is ill equipped to assess the probabilities (as Howard Kunreuther
has often pointed out) or does not take into account the full magnitude
of losses and costs, then the choice observed will not be the optimal
choice. Finally, the value of improving disaster forecasts is a dynamic
metric: it hinges on how losses and cost change over time. This may
seem a bit abstract, but consider that the current climate change debate
revolves around escalating losses observed along the nation’s coastline.
At first blush, rising losses could be interpreted to mean that the prob-
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abilities have shifted. However, it is just as likely that both the coastal
population and the wealth at risk have risen over the past 50 years. The
framework just presented allows for either or both. Roger Pielke Jr.
(2005) performed a careful analysis of hurricane losses and concluded
that rising losses are tied to population and wealth and not to increased
frequency and severity. Although there is still a healthy debate about
the issue (Emanuel 2005), the cost-loss framework has proven useful in
pointing research in the right direction.
A Deeper Look at the Economics of Climate Change
The cost-loss model also lends itself to a deeper analysis of climate
change. Although the problem still involves cost, loss, and the probability of disaster, the interpretations are different. The cost of mitigating
the effects of climate change is the reduction in economic growth resulting from curtailing CO2 emissions. The economics of cap-and-trade
are pretty clear: investments in cleaner-burning fuels and higher-cost
renewables will ratchet growth downward. The cost to GDP is open to
debate, but few will argue that the difference in growth paths is the cost
of capping emissions. The loss incurred in the event of climatic warming is just as contentious. But much of the debate revolves around the
magnitude of loss. There is considerable disagreement regarding the degree to which the climate will change, and predictions of the economic
impacts are therefore equally murky. Despite this, no one is arguing
that climate change will be benign. If we assume for argument’s sake
that climate change losses will be disastrous and that anthropogenic
CO2 is in fact the chief culprit, a case can be made for controlling emissions now. Assume that Panthropogenic is the current assessment regarding
the likelihood that anthropogenic CO2 is the chief cause. Assume too
that if emissions are curtailed now, future losses would be mitigated.
On the other hand, if no action is taken to control atmospheric carbon,
and CO2 is indeed the causal agent triggering a more varied climate, the
decision to do nothing will be irreversible. In contrast, the decision to
limit fossil fuel use now can be revisited once the results of climate research become more definitive. This option is reversible if at some later
date it is revealed that atmospheric carbon is the product of warming
and not the other way around. In the economics literature the benefit of
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taking action now that may be revised later when updated information
is available is referred to as quasioption value.
The factors underlying this decision are the same as those that
shaped the use of climate and weather information in the previous costloss example. Carbon control is worthwhile if the losses are sufficiently
high, the control costs low, and the a priori probabilistic assessment
of the connection between CO2 and climate change is high. That is,
the decision to curtail anthropogenic CO2 is optimal if Ccontrol/Ldisaster <
Panthropogenic. Despite its simplicity, the framework provides a valuable
guide for debating climate policy. First, a good case can be made for
taking action now despite the uncertainties regarding the causal mechanism. Waiting until these uncertainties are resolved could be the least
appealing option. The decision to act now hinges on the cost, the losses,
and the current state of knowledge regarding the direction of the causal
arrow—that is, the probability that the arrow representing causation
points from anthropogenic CO2 to climate (i.e., anthropogenic CO2 is
causing climate change) rather than from climate to CO2. Second, the
framework properly draws attention to the role of anthropogenic CO2
rather than to warming itself.

PROSPECTIVE VIEW OF LOSSES
It is clear from the preceding retrospective that losses (either objectively measured or perceived by the decision maker) are crucial to
managing natural hazards. However, what constitutes a loss and how
losses should be measured remain murky. Before we look at losses in
more detail, it is worth taking a moment to reflect on the possibility that
the market may have already discounted for locational risk. In other
words, the price of housing might already accommodate the location
of the property in an area subject to some hazard. If it does, then there
is no reason to proceed any further. There has been some debate about
this, but in my opinion it is highly unlikely that prospective buyers are
well informed about risks of any sort. Howard Kunreuther has spent the
better part of his career arguing that decision makers make poor choices
because they use simple heuristics. In some cases they totally ignore
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low-probability events, and in others they overstate the likelihood of
high-consequence events. The market for housing (and willingness to
pay) reflects this. However, if market prices reflect considerable ignorance and misinformation, it is unwise to utilize them to formulate
policy. The recent housing market collapse serves to illustrate this point
quite nicely. Despite what orthodox economists claim for the market,
I believe, at least for natural hazards, that housing prices provide little
useful information regarding willingness to pay for safety. Loss studies are so important precisely because markets provide such unreliable
information.
So, what losses are we talking about and how should they be
measured? As will be discussed shortly, loss consists of the obvious
(damage to buildings, contents, infrastructure, as well as loss of life)
and the not-so-obvious (loss of cultural icons, historic monuments, a
sense of place, and the indirect economic dislocations stemming from
damage). Table 4.1 provides a simple list. I will address each briefly and
then move on to regional and national economic impacts, which I will
address in more detail.
Property Losses and Deaths
There is a substantial body of work tying wind velocity, ground
shaking, and flood depth to property damage and subsequent loss of
life. Although empirically estimated damage functions contain a substantial error band, they seem to work fairly well, particularly when
damages are aggregated over a wide area. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s HAZUS program (Hazards United States), a sophisticated geographic information system, incorporates such functions
for a variety of building types and hazards. In my view, property loss
is the least problematic of all the losses. Similarly, there appears to be
an empirically verifiable linkage between fatalities and the number of
structures destroyed, at least for sudden-onset events such as tornadoes
and earthquakes. Thus damage and fatality seem reasonably predictable through available means. The same cannot be said about the other
categories of loss I am addressing, including value of life.
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The value of a life
Although deaths are predictable, the value attached to each death
remains an elusive concept. I realize that this is a highly contentious
topic fraught with technical and ethical complexities. Having said that,
I want to raise a few issues. Most important, disaster mortality and
morbidity models account for statistical lives lost, not identified lives.
No one worries about insurance companies that project loss of life and
attempt to quantify those losses. An identified life is something quite
different, however. No one would or should attempt to assess the value
of an identified life. Second, if we are unwilling to attach a value to
these so-called statistical deaths, then we might finesse the question
by determining how much it costs to preserve a life through protective
measures such as land use regulation and improved building codes. It
is then up to the public to determine whether the costs are worth it. The
benefits of hazard mitigation would have to be weighed against other
life-saving options (e.g., dialysis, wellness programs). Although the
problems inherent in estimating and valuing loss of life are formidable,
they are relatively manageable.
Loss of cultural icons and historic monuments
While a solid foundation exists for the debate over mortality and
direct damage to property, the state of knowledge regarding the other
losses shown in Table 4.1 pales in comparison. Value is inherent in cultural icons, historic monuments, and a sense of place. Hurricane Katrina
did more than destroy the city of New Orleans. The nation lost a cultural heritage that was rich in diversity and steeped in history. Much that
has been written about post-Katrina New Orleans bemoans the changes
wrought by the storm. The losses suffered go beyond the number of
Table 4.1 An Analysis of Losses
Mortality, morbidity, along with property damage are the best known.
Loss of environmental services, cultural icons, historic monuments, and a
sense of place are less well known and understood.
Systemic risk and loss of regional economic activity are also not well understood.
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deaths and the damage to buildings inundated because of breached
levees, and even beyond New Orleans itself to affect the nation as a
whole. Despite the growing body of literature attempting to establish
values for nonmarket losses, measurement of iconic value remains a
problem. Icons and monuments have market values that are readily
measurable through surveys and travel-cost methods. However, such
techniques don’t reveal their existence value. Research on this rich and
intriguing subject is still in its infancy.
Systemic and indirect losses
Systemic and indirect losses are also not well understood. The
current financial panic has served to rivet attention on just how large
contagion effects and their associated indirect impacts can be. Furthermore, the current economic meltdown underscores an important
point. That is, the loss anticipated by any one participant can turn out
to be vastly different when interindustry linkages and uncertainty are
considered. Or, as Gary Becker said in addressing the 2008 financial
meltdown, “While financial specialists understand how individual assets function, even they have limited understanding of the aggregate
risks created by the system” (Becker 2008).
This observation bears directly on the cost-loss framework developed earlier, and on willingness to pay for protection. The events of late
2008 and early 2009 have underscored the point that an individual’s
perceptions are often at odds with systemwide risks. Given this discrepancy, it seems again unwise to rely on market forces to suggest a
meaningful measure of willingness to pay for safety. I will spend the
remainder of the paper on this topic, emphasizing the likely economic
consequences of disaster, how to measure them (including why commonly utilized techniques fail), and why the results of some disasters
differ significantly from those of others.
Alternative Ways of Modeling the Regional Economic
Response to Shocks
There is currently no clear consensus as to how supply shocks can
be successfully modeled. Input-output models have been tried, as have
a wide range of alternatives, including computable general equilibrium
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models, econometric models, and even postevent surveys. They all
leave something to be desired. A lot of what I will be discussing relies
on a basic understanding of input-output models. A brief discussion of
input-output basics is provided in Appendix 4A for those unfamiliar
with the technique and its terminology.
Input-output models were designed to explain how final demand
changes ripple throughout a region’s (or nation’s) interconnected sectors. The linkages are rather straightforward. An increase or decrease
in demand for one sector’s production indirectly boosts or reduces demand for ingredients supplied by other sectors. As a result, a one-dollar
change in demand leads to more than one dollar’s change in production
when all intermediate transactions are accounted for. Input-output models have one fatal limitation: they are incapable of addressing the types
of bottlenecks commonly observed after disaster. These models have no
way of accounting for the possibility that supplying sectors may lack
the capacity to provide needed inputs (leading to forward-linked losses)
or, conversely, that producing sectors may lack the capacity to absorb
all that their suppliers wish to ship (causing backward-linked losses).
Since the input-output technique implicitly assumes that there are
no limits to production, it is incapable of treating the uneven set of
supply constraints typically observed after disaster. It would be purely
coincidental if the pattern of economic disruption emerging after a
natural disaster matched the pre-event production pattern. Therefore,
altering final demands to fit postdisaster production patterns would be
problematic.
The other techniques just mentioned also have limitations. Computable general equilibrium models (CGEs) are an elaborate form of
input-output, with an interindustry table at the core. CGEs permit final demand substitutions as shortages materialize. Unfortunately, the
estimates of substitution elasticities embedded in the CGEs are problematic at best, particularly for unique events such as natural disasters.
Furthermore, in some cases where a public utility is impacted (such as
a water treatment or supply system), there is no meaningful measure of
substitutability. CGEs are less useful for that type of loss estimation.
Finally, a shortcoming of both econometric models (particularly
time series) and postdisaster surveys is that they are calibrated using a
set of unique events. Time series techniques, like event analysis, look
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at the difference between trends with and without a disaster. Although
appealing on the surface, event analysis is applied to an event. Since it
is an event, it reflects only the characteristics of that event: the disaster relief policies in place, the pattern of destruction, the nature of the
economy, and so on. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize from such
an analysis to other potential events. Because of this limitation, event
analysis may be useful for forensic studies, but not for policy analysis.
A similar criticism applies to postevent surveys. What can one say beyond what the survey indicates about the loss sustained by a particular
place, given that it was struck by a particular event at a time when a
particular set of disaster relief policies applied? Very little.
An Algorithm for Analyzing Supply Shocks
An algorithm was developed at Colorado State University to address the shortcomings of the approaches just discussed. As in the case
of CGE, the algorithm takes a region’s interindustry linkages as its core.
It then allows for excess capacity in each sector as a function of the
region’s rate of unemployment. Furthermore, the algorithm augments
internal production with the aid of imports from other regions. Finally,
it allows for the stimulative effects of reconstruction spending and the
fiscal drag caused by indebtedness. The algorithm then seeks out the
best outcome (in terms of regional income) that rebalances the economy.
The economy is rebalanced when all excess supplies or demands are
eliminated. See Figure 4.2 for a schematic of the rebalancing process.
A simple numerical illustration
I’ll use the example input-output table provided in Appendix 4A to
analyze a few simple economic shocks. In the simplest shock each sector suffers a proportionate reduction in output. If a disaster eliminates
50 percent of both sectors’ capacity, then output in sectors S1 and S2
would be limited to 50 and 75, respectively. The outcome of such a
constraint is self-evident. Eventually, shipments to each of the sectors
will shrink, as will income to households. They all decline by 50 percent. Household spending for each of the two sectors’ products will also
shrink by 50 percent. Exports are assumed to shrink proportionately
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Figure 4.2 Rebalancing Algorithm
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as well. The final result is self-evident: the economy will shrink by 50
percent.
This is of course the simplest of cases. Things get a bit more complicated when the pattern of production is limited in some disproportionate
way and reconstruction spending amplifies the effects of bottlenecks. In
addition, shortages can be avoided through imports or utilizing excess
capacity of the region’s factories. These are but a few of the options
contained in the algorithm.
One last note: the economy can rebalance at many levels. Even in
the previous example, balance could have been achieved at 25 percent
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of predisaster production or even at zero. It is important, therefore, that
rebalancing occur in light of some objective. The one that makes the
most sense is to rebalance in a way that maximizes the region’s postevent income. However, a result that maximizes regional income may
not be the one produced by market forces. Since I have called CGE into
question (due to unreliable estimates of substitution elasticities, among
other problems), I will defend the algorithm’s result as the best feasible
outcome. This at least provides an envelope of outcomes that policymakers can use to compare different hazards or mitigation strategies.
A few additional notes about the algorithm
The CSU algorithm is based on a 20-sector interindustry table,
while rebalancing is achieved by an iterative procedure where sectoral
outputs are adjusted within the confines of postevent constraints and
capacities. Adjustments proceed until the algorithm finds that all other
feasible adjustment patterns yield an inferior level of regional income.
The process is repeated each month throughout the period of recovery,
yielding a measure of how much the region’s income is impacted. Finally, the algorithm tracks shifts in interregional trade as rebalancing
alters the region’s import-export mix. In addition, it accounts for financial liabilities incurred both nationally and regionally. Liabilities are
amortized and household demand is adjusted accordingly. The entire
process is complex but has been tested and proved to yield reasonable
results. A full discussion of the process is beyond the scope of the chapter, but the outlines of a typical result provide some useful insights into
how a stricken economy is likely to rebound.
A Prototypical Pattern of Economic Recovery
Figure 4.3 shows what is typically observed after a disaster. Initially there is some disruption of income flows and a decline in spending.
Then, as reconstruction begins and damaged sectors are restored, the
economy rebounds until gains are observed. In most instances the rebuilding stimulus produces an economic boom exceeding the predisaster
level of activity. Eventually recovery is complete and reconstruction
spending dries up. If reconstruction is financed externally (via insurance or federal aid), regional income can be expected to subside to the
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Figure 4.3 Prototypical Regional Loss Pattern
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pre-event level. If, however, the region is forced to draw upon savings
or borrow, the added debt burden acts as a drag on future income, since
households and local government are forced to offset the debt by curtailing spending. Total loss is simply the discounted sum of the stream
of losses and gains, as shown in Figure 4.3.
The national pattern looks similar. Disruption ripples to surrounding regions via shifts in imports and exports, the use of extraregional
construction talent, and the liabilities incurred nationally.
Hurricane Katrina: An Illustration of How the Model Works
Direct damage to the Gulf region as a result of Hurricane Katrina
has been estimated at around $200 billion (give or take $50 billion).
This seemingly fuzzy estimate is in fact rather precise given that regional and national economic losses have yet to be tabulated. I took
this opportunity to exercise the algorithm in order to come up with an
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estimate of what Katrina cost New Orleans Parish and the country as
a whole. As expected, parish income fell sharply after the storm. Disruptions to tourism, oil and gas operations, and barge traffic rippled
throughout the region. This decline was partially offset by an immediate injection of spending for relief and recovery. At the same time that
New Orleans proper was in a state of collapse, two conflicting forces
that impacted the economies of neighboring regions were set in motion.
First, the New Orleans economy was so damaged that some of the relief
and reconstruction stimulus leaked to surrounding economies. That is to
say, outside construction talent and other related imports were brought
into the city to supplement what survived the storm. Economies outside
New Orleans benefited as a result. Second, as the New Orleans economy shrank, normal imports into the region declined as well. Figure
4.4 shows the results of the CSU simulation. The upper line shows the
recovery path for New Orleans proper, while the lower line provides an
estimate of the total loss to both New Orleans and the rest of the nation.
Figure 4.4 Economic Loss Inside and Outside New Orleans (Delayed
Reconstruction)
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Figure 4.5 The Economic Impact of Katrina Contrasted with Andrew
1.20
1.15

Miami-Dade

100% external aid, normal recovery

Index of regional income

1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85

New Orleans

50% external aid, moderate recovery

0.80
0.75
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Months

SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

One might ask why the New Orleans economy suffered so much.
To help answer this question, the economic repercussions of Hurricane
Andrew on Miami–Dade County were calculated using the algorithm.
Figure 4.5 shows the results. In contrast to Katrina, Andrew produced
little long-term impact, a difference attributable to four factors. First,
Katrina caused about five times the damage. That alone would explain
much of the difference. Second, the New Orleans economy is significantly smaller than the Miami-Dade economy, which could cope with
bottlenecks by drawing upon a larger internal excess capacity. Third,
since Andrew’s winds were the primary cause of damage, property insurance covered most of the loss. Because normal homeowners policies
exclude flooding, little of the flood loss (the primary source of damage from Katrina) was insured. Finally, New Orleans faced a housing
shortage, so it was difficult to attract outside reconstruction talent. Furthermore, the city became embroiled in a contentious debate concerning
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how to deal with the ongoing flood hazard. The resulting reconstruction
delays still limit the amount of rebuilding that has occurred.

FINAL REMARKS
This chapter has been divided into retrospective and prospective
parts. The first part emphasized a few key ideas that, with the aid of
hindsight, seem to be logical extensions of water resources economics
and the economics of information. Having said that, I am struck by the
power of these ideas. I believe that even the simplest of cost-loss models offers valuable insights that are too often lost on policymakers. The
confused debate over climate change policy serves to buttress my point.
The most puzzling aspect of the literature of the 1960s and 1970s is that
so little effort was devoted to categorizing and measuring losses, despite
the fact that cost-loss models are worthless without a reasonable loss assessment. Much of this early work was devoted to conceptualizing the
problem, where loss was supposed to be self-evident. The second part
of the chapter, the prospective view, suggested several topics that need
additional attention. Finally, I took a controversial position regarding
the use of survey techniques, time series analysis, and CGE. I hold that
these methodologies have limited value for predicting how regions are
likely to be impacted by unique events. More important, the economic
climate has shifted drastically from the time when generous federal aid
was available and little excess housing capacity existed. It is dangerous
to rely on models that were calibrated using economic conditions that
may no longer apply.

Appendix 4A
A Primer on Interindustry Analysis
Input-output tables are the foundation of regional economics. As the name
implies, an input-output table traces the flow of products from industry to industry and from industry to households, to government, and for export. It also
traces the ingredients inherent in an industry’s production (it is, in effect, a
recipe). Operational tables can contain as few as 10 sectors or as many as 360.
Table 4A.1 shows a simple two-sector table.
The columns represent the shipment of goods from industry to industry, to
households, and as exports. The right-hand summation is the total shipped (in
the case of each industry), the total income earned (in the case of households)
and the total amount imported into the region (in the case of imports). The
units shown are typically measured in dollars. So, using the row of the first
sector, S1, to illustrate, $20 billion is shipped from the first sector to itself:
for example, oil may be used to produce more oil. An additional $45 billion
worth is shipped to the second sector, $30 billion to households, and $5 billion
exported from the region. The total amount shipped from S1 is therefore $100
billion. The numbers in the first column are interpreted differently. Sector 1’s
total output is $100 billion (the bottom of column 1). Of this total, Sector 1
contributes $20 billion and Sector 2 contributes $40 billion. Household income
in the form of payments for labor and investments amount to another $20 billion of the total, and finally imports of $20 billion from elsewhere make up
the remaining part of the total. The shaded area is referred to as interindustry
demands. Note that gross shipments must equal supply (gross product) for the
economy to be in balance.
Any shock to this economy will begin with a restriction in supply, which
then sets a number of adjustments in motion. Declining production means
lower income for workers, which reduces household demand for consumer
items. Declining production also results in bottlenecks in the production of
other interrelated industries. Such restrictions feed back to the sector suffering
the initial shock. Although somewhat simple to describe, an operational model
requires a complex algorithm, which is briefly described in the main body of
the chapter.
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Table 4A.1 Example, Input-Output Table: A Typical Interindustry Table
Gross
S1
S2
Households Exports
shipments
20
45
30
5
100
S1
S2
40
15
30
65
150
Households
20
60
0
0
80
Imports
20
30
20
0
70
Gross product
100
150
80
70
400
NOTE: S1 = industry sector 1; S2 = industry sector 2.
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Private Solutions to Public Disasters
Self-Reliance and Social Resilience
Peter J. Boettke
Daniel J. Smith
George Mason University

. . . What has so often excited wonder [is] the great rapidity with
which countries recover from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all traces of the mischiefs done by
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the ravages of war. An enemy
lays waste a country by fire and sword, and destroys or carries
away nearly all the moveable wealth existing in it: all the inhabitants are ruined, and yet in a few years after, everything is much as
it was before.
—John Stuart Mill (1848)

It is often in the aftermath of the worst calamities of nature and war
that the power of human ingenuity and resilience is most clearly demonstrated. John Stuart Mill, writing in 1848, noted that observers were
frequently amazed at the rapidity with which inhabitants of a devastated
area were able to recover. It is at the very time when public and private
infrastructure and formal institutions are at their weakest—following a
public disaster—that civil society would be expected to collapse. Yet
calamity after calamity has demonstrated the resounding ability of private actors to coordinate recoveries from the most severe of crises.
Unfortunately, not all catastrophes are followed by rapid or even
complete recoveries. Slow or incomplete recoveries are attributable in
part to the uncontrollable features of the disaster, such as its magnitude
or its particular form. Mill argued that large-scale destruction of human capital hinders recovery because local knowledge is essential in
coordinating a rapid recovery. A more important factor, especially for
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economists and policymakers, is the presence of institutional features
that can significantly impede the natural tendency of unfettered people
to achieve a complete and rapid recovery following a disaster.
Profit-seeking entrepreneurs are vital to any recovery process. Entrepreneurs must be able to unrestrictedly allocate resources to their
most urgent employments, as expressed by customers through prices.
Any interference with the structure of prices distorts the signals that
entrepreneurs receive, misdirecting or hampering their efforts. Misallocation of resources can literally be a matter of life and death in the
immediate aftermath of a natural disaster or war. Price ceilings dampen
the ability of profits to induce increased supply of needed goods and
services, and they distort the ability of prices to signal consumers to
ration and economize scarce resources. Poor policy unnecessarily
blocks and inhibits the labor and capital adjustments necessary for a
complete and timely recovery by distorting entrepreneurial calculation
and preventing entrepreneurs from allocating resources to their most
productive uses.
Despite the interference of regulations and uncertainty brought
about by government action, humankind has demonstrated a remarkable resilience following a natural or man-made disaster. We argue that
this is due to the civilizing and coordinating roles played by civil society. For-profit companies, charities, and churches play a vital role in the
recovery process. These organizations have proven to be the first and
the best-equipped responders to disasters, jump-starting the recovery
process.

COMPOUNDING NATURE’S FURY WITH HUMAN FOLLY
Humankind has shown an amazing resilience when it comes to
overcoming nature’s fury. Yet when nature’s fury is compounded with
human folly, this resilience may suffer, eroded by corruption, signal distortions, and regime uncertainty. Ironically, it is often well-intentioned
people who create the folly that magnifies nature’s fury due to a misunderstanding of the way incentives affect human behavior.
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We use the case of Hurricane Katrina to show what types of institutions and policies are robust to natural disasters, allowing for maximum
speed and totality of recovery. We show how natural disasters can
magnify the adverse effects of poor institutions and policies already in
place. Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana in August 2005, causing over
$100 billion in property damage and 1,800 deaths (Chamlee-Wright
and Rothschild 2007), making it one of the worst natural disasters to
ever hit the United States. This destruction has been amplified by policies already in place, such as flood insurance and a corrupt levee board;
by policies in the immediate aftermath, such as excessive layers of
regulation; and in the long term through the creation of instability and
uncertainty for investors.
Even though entrepreneurs were burdened with excessive and inhibiting regulations and poor policy, civil society was still able to show
an amazing resilience in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Corporations like Wal-Mart and Home Depot, as well as small businesses like
gas stations, were able to respond quickly to the devastation, providing
necessary goods and services that would allow more businesses and
residents to come back to New Orleans. Profit-seeking entrepreneurs
and private charities and churches played a central coordinating role in
the aftermath of Katrina.
Pre-Katrina
The Army Corps of Engineers was entrusted with overseeing and
constructing levees around Louisiana after the Great Flood of 1927,
though the federal government had been overseeing the levees since
creating the Mississippi River Commission in 1879 (Davis 2000).
The Army Corps of Engineers was caught in conflicting layers of bureaucracy, primarily between the demands and desires of the federal
government and the local citizens and politicians of Louisiana.
Three years prior to Katrina, McQuaid and Schleifstein (2002) issued a report concluding that New Orleans’s inadequate levees would
not withstand a direct hit by a hurricane (Horne 2006). John Barry
(1998) wrote a book detailing the history of the Mississippi Flood of
1927, especially focusing on the failures of the Army Corps of Engineers and local politicians to take flood control seriously. John McPhee
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(1989) wrote a book detailing how the levees would eventually fail; Eric
Berger, a science journalist, reported on the devastation that a direct hit
on New Orleans would cause (Berger 2001; Brinkley 2006). Despite
such warnings from these and other experts, no substantial measures
were taken to fortify the weakened and often ill-constructed levees (van
Heerdon and Bryan 2006). When Katrina hit, the Army Corps of Engineers was managing a largely dilapidated system of levees insufficient
to stand up to a storm of the magnitude of Katrina. Not only did the
levees lack structural integrity, but the construction was also persistently behind schedule: upgrades had been pushed back as long as 13
years, leaving one section of flood work still unfinished when Katrina
hit (Horne 2006).
The poor state of the levees was primarily due to the corruption on
the levee board.1 Adamantly and successfully resisting the advice of the
Army Corps of Engineers, the levee board fortified frontal protection
for the levees instead of focusing on an extensive network of pumps up
to several miles inland (Horne 2006). This frontal protection—a system of floodgates—came in at one-third the cost of the favored pump
and levee arrangement. However, it required continuous maintenance
by the levee board, a task board members were not willing to commit
themselves to.
Local politicians were able to funnel federal money earmarked for
levee renovation and construction to benefit special-interest groups. The
shipping industry successfully lobbied for harbor upgrades and canal
dredging projects from this federal money, both projects that actually
increased the chances of hurricane damage (Brinkley 2006). In addition, local politicians who controlled the Levee Board and the Sewage
and Water Board resisted undertaking costly and unpopular but highly
recommended projects in order to bolster voter support by devoting
resources to more immediate problems facing New Orleans, such as
corruption, schooling, and urban infrastructure problems (Brinkley
2006; Cooper and Block 2006).
With the levees standing 14 feet above the average water level of
Lake Pontchartrain, locals believed themselves safe as long as the city
pumps were working to take care of any spillovers. This belief, however, was predicated on the assumption that the levees would hold up.
Charitable organizations, such as the Red Cross, were aware of the dan-
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ger that a large storm posed to these insufficient levees and refused
to operate within the flood zone. The condition of the levees was bad
enough that a significant number of the personnel in charge of managing
the levees evacuated prior to the storm, leaving the levees understaffed
(Horne 2006). Though the initial break in the levee was only 20 feet
and could have been shored up with the heavy equipment and sandbags
owned by the levee agency, levee employees did not respond and the
break turned into a 200-foot gap.
While local politicians were shirking their duty to maintain the
system of levees, state and federal government officials were actively
encouraging homeowners and businesses to reside in the disaster-prone
areas threatened by the dilapidated levees. Subsidized flood insurance
and the expectation of postdisaster relief brought about what economists call moral hazard problems in disaster-prone areas. Moral hazard
problems occur when people are protected from incurring the full cost
of their choices and thus make worse and more costly decisions than
they would absent such protection. Lowering the cost of residing in
areas with high flood and wind risk artificially increases the number of
people and the amount of property in disaster-prone areas (Sutter 2008).
In an unmolested market, increased insurance rates and the expectation
of incurring storm damages would force residents to account for and
bear the cost of living in disaster-prone areas.
Furthermore, state governments have been notoriously resistant to
letting insurance companies mandate mitigation efforts by customers
in these high-risk areas. When cost-effective preventive measures are
necessary in order to obtain insurance, an incentive exists to build more
structurally sound buildings. Even such simple measures as installing window shutters can significantly reduce the probability of wind
damage.
State governments interfere with insurance companies’ risk assessments and premiums for various types of mitigation in two ways. First,
several states in disaster-prone areas require state approval of mitigation discounts, allowing competing insurance companies and politically
motivated elected officials to second-guess insurance companies’ decisions. Second, some states, such as Louisiana, Florida, and North
Carolina, require discounts for certain mitigation practices. Since insurance companies already have the incentives to offer discounts for
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effective mitigation practices, government interference, when binding,
requires allocation of resources to mitigation measures that have not
been proven effective. Laws that require insurance companies to fund
sham mitigation practices stem from political favors both to interested
parties and to genuinely concerned politicians who do not have a full
understanding of insurance markets.
New Orleans’s long tradition of special-interest legislation, in
addition to leading to poor levee maintenance and construction, also
shackled entrepreneurs’ abilities to respond to consumers’ needs in
the wake of the havoc created by Katrina. In postdisaster recoveries,
such restrictions prove extraordinarily burdensome for two primary
reasons. First, the bureaucratic process of applying for permits, inspections, and assistance is especially difficult when many public buildings
are damaged and public employees displaced. Filling out the paperwork required for engaging in various forms of business activities is
a daunting process even when public infrastructure is not shut down
or understaffed. Second, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, the return of
people with local human capital is essential to the recovery process. Entrepreneurs, vital for recovery, may become frustrated by a complicated
bureaucratic process and may simply choose to not return following a
disaster. At best, regulatory processes only slow down and prevent entrepreneurs from putting their human capital to immediate use. In order
to attract residents and other business owners back to the affected areas,
an initial set of enterprising business owners must return and provide
basic goods and services. Residents and other business owners waiting
for these basic goods and services to be available before returning are,
over time, more likely to establish themselves in the cities they took
refuge in, making it costlier to return.
Occupational licensing, granted to construction unions to artificially
increase wages, restricted construction experts from other states from
setting up shop in the disaster-stricken areas to jump-start the rebuilding process. The six-month waiting period mandated for a construction
permit was not rescinded in the wake of the damage created by Katrina.
To its credit, the city of New Orleans did suspend inspections on construction projects, allowing, for instance, carpenters and electricians to
inspect their own work. Historic preservation regulations also inhibited
rebuilding in New Orleans. Draconian preservation laws were applied
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in historic districts, making it difficult for contractors to quickly rebuild
and restore historic buildings affected by severe flooding.
Preexisting restrictions on the adult-to-child ratio for child care
centers were also not relaxed following the storm (Chamlee-Wright
2008a). To initiate progress toward recovery, entrepreneurs and business owners needed places offering care and supervision for their
children. Even two years after Katrina hit, only 94 of 275 day care centers in New Orleans had reopened. With so many damaged buildings
and missing employees, the adult-to-child capacity restrictions meant
that many parents were unable to focus completely on recovery efforts.
The numerous residents who fled with their children to cities such as
Houston and Atlanta found it hard to take on full-time employment due
to similar restrictions in those cities.
Zoning regulations and building codes also shackled entrepreneurs in their efforts to speedily reopen stores to offer basic services
and goods. The opening of a health clinic was delayed by nearly six
months because it was located in a residential zone and had building
code violations such as a handicap ramp with hand rails on only one
side. Similarly, a laundry had to wait weeks for an inspection after the
building was completed and ready to open up.
Layers of regulation and profit windfalls from postdisaster relief create an institutional environment ripe for corruption. In 2004,
Louisiana was ranked fortieth out of 50 states in the Pacific Research
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the States Index (Huang, McCormick,
and McQuillan 2004) and had relatively high costs of conducting business compared to other states. In addition, Louisiana was ranked the
third most corrupt state in the nation in 2004 (Corporate Crime Reporter
2004).
During Katrina
The folly already in place prior to Katrina, which drastically increased the amount of damage the storm caused, was also compounded
with folly during the storm and its immediate aftermath. While most
economists are familiar with the concept of the tragedy of the commons,
a term coined by the biologist Garrett Hardin, most are not familiar with
the tragedy of the anticommons. The tragedy of the anticommons oc-
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curs when several government agencies have the ability to regulate and
control a common area, creating unnecessary, and often repetitive and
even conflicting, layers of bureaucracy. Additional layers of bureaucracy, especially following a disaster, can cost lives by slowing down
the response times of entrepreneurs. In addition, complicated layers of
bureaucracy, especially when combined with political windfalls from
disaster relief, drastically increase the chances of venality.
The relief efforts for Hurricane Katrina orchestrated by FEMA have
been notoriously plagued by corruption and abuse. In fact, according
to the Government Accountability Office, the cost of corruption and
abuse for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita could reach $1.4 billion (Kutz
and Ryan 2006). In a study on natural disasters and corruption, Leeson
and Sobel (2008) found that every additional $1 per capita spent on
disaster relief by FEMA increases corruption in the average state by up
to 2.5 percent, due to the windfalls created by the programs. This suggests that the states along the Gulf Coast might be notoriously corrupt
precisely because they are frequently hit by natural disasters. Leeson
and Sobel estimate that eliminating FEMA disaster relief would reduce
corruption by more than 20 percent in the average state. In a separate article, Leeson and Sobel (2007) trace the origins of the corruption to the
time-sensitive nature of disaster relief; increased oversight shows little
promise in curbing this corruption because, in their words, “protocol
will take a backseat when disasters actually strike.”
When infrastructure and normal modes of communicating and organizing activity are slow, incomplete, and impeded by interference
following a public disaster, the need to allow market prices to adjust
to communicate information to the relevant actors becomes even more
important. Hayek (1945) discusses the heavily dispersed nature of
knowledge and the importance of a freely fluctuating price system as
the most efficient system to coordinate economic activity across an array of activities because of its ability to convey the specific knowledge
of time and place to the relevant economic actors. With so many needs
after a natural disaster, it is difficult, especially for an altruistic government agent operating in the field, to decide whose and what needs
should be met first. Sobel and Leeson (2007) find that while private
actors are able to respond to transient, decentralized information in a
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timely manner following a disaster, public officials are forced to make
decisions with, at best, scanty and outdated information.
Price controls following a disaster are known for distorting price
signals, which is counterproductive at a time when those signals are
most needed to coordinate the allocation of resources to their most
urgent employment. William Carden (2009) noted that emergency situations are inherently chaotic and that a well-functioning unmolested
price system can significantly reduce the chaos. Price ceilings discourage economical consumption and take away the profit-seeking motive
for entrepreneurs to find innovative ways of allocating resources where
the demand is highest.
Post-Katrina
Continuous government interference in the market, policy reversals, and varying responses to disasters create uncertainty for market
actors. This uncertainty may inhibit entrepreneurial investment in
current profit opportunities. Robert Higgs (1997) calls this process in
which government adversely affects investment by not credibly adhering to a set policy regime uncertainty. In the aftermath of a disaster, the
stymieing effect of regime uncertainty on investment is magnified, as it
paralyzes the entrepreneurship and investment necessary for a full and
rapid recovery. Market actors, left in the dark concerning the nature and
timing of goods and services to be provided by government agencies,
cut back on much-needed investment. Government regulations, such
as price controls, distort the signaling process and prevent the market
adjustment that is at the very heart of economic efficiency.
By focusing on standard postdisaster recovery procedures, public
officials disregarded the necessary role of private actors in the recovery process (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2008a). Focusing on procuring
more federal dollars, imposing stronger regulations, and periodically
implementing new recovery plans, policymakers intruded on the recovery process, preventing entrepreneurs from rapidly returning to their
businesses. In a structured set of neutral interviews, residents named
barriers erected by government policies and programs, in particular
those intended to assist redevelopment, as the biggest challenge they
had faced since returning (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2007).
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Despite these needless barriers, entrepreneurs exercised persistence
and creativity to coordinate the start of a recovery. Population estimates
for the New Orleans MSA show that its total population reached 86
percent of pre-Katrina levels by July of 2008 (GNOCDC 2008), as
shown in Table 5.1.2 Although the area remains far short of a full recovery, especially in the parishes most severely hit by Katrina, the data
nonetheless reflects an impressive display of resiliency. This resilience,
however, is largely due to private-sector responses, and not formulaic
public-sector responses (Boettke et al. 2007). In fact, those areas where
public-sector influence undermined private-sector response times show
the least recovery progress.

SELF-RELIANCE AND SOCIAL RESILIENCE
According to Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling, the primary problem residents of New Orleans faced in the recovery process was that of
coordinating expectations (Gosselin 2005). If residents expected people
to come back and work to bring about a recovery, then they would. On
the other hand, if residents did not expect others to come back, they in
fact would not come back, and the human capital necessary for recovery would never materialize. Private corporations, such as Wal-Mart
and Home Depot, and determined small business owners were able to
solve Schelling’s coordination problem by being the first movers. By
quickly getting their stores reopened and their employees back in town,
these businesses were able to provide the basic goods and services that
were necessary for other residents and business owners to come back to
New Orleans as well.
Through in-depth interviews she conducted in New Orleans, Emily
Chamlee-Wright (2007; 2008b) found that private actors played a large
role in coordinating a recovery through mutual assistance, commercial cooperation, and private reestablishment of community resources.
Residents with house damage and business owners who found their
stores damaged or looted would not have been able to return immediately after Katrina to jump-start the recovery process without mutual
assistance. Returning residents were able to coordinate a return with

Table 5.1 Population by Parish, New Orleans (LA) MSA
July 2005
July 2006
July 2007
July 2008

Jefferson
450,848
422,222
440,339
436,181

Orleans
455,046
210,768
288,113
311,853

Plaquemines
28,565
21,610
21,597
21,276

St. Bernard
64,890
13,924
33,439
37,722

St. Charles
50,116
51,868
51,892
51,547

St. John
45,568
47,647
47,678
46,994

St. Tammany
217,367
223,863
226,263
228,456

Total
1,312,400
991,902
1,109,411
1,134,029

SOURCE: GNOCDC (2008).
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others by committing to exchanging their different skills and remaining
resources. A lumber store owner was able to trade room in his largely
undamaged house for assistance in rebuilding his store, which had been
badly damaged and looted. Chamlee-Wright also found that commercial entities showed novel and extensive cooperation with each other in
order to signal to evacuees that New Orleans would recover and that basic goods and services would be available to returning residents looking
to start the recovery process. Companies were willing to offer harderhit companies generous terms of credit and even free supplies in order
to help these other businesses open up to attract more residents back.
Churches, such as the Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church, were
able to reestablish community services vital for attracting back the local
knowledge necessary for a complete and timely recovery.
The Doux-Commerce Thesis, put forth by the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, holds that commerce plays a key role in civil society: it
is the very act of trading that civilizes a society. Through the process of
exchange we find mutually beneficial margins that encourage cooperation, and seeking to establish an honest reputation to facilitate future
transactions gives business owners and their customers a motive to exhibit desirable moral traits. In the chaotic aftermath of a disaster like
Katrina, this civilizing role of reestablishing commerce is necessary for
the recovery process.
Although hindered by policies that exacerbated the toll of Katrina,
private companies and organizations undertook efforts that significantly
eased the severity of the disaster. Horwitz (2009) found that big-box
retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot, operating under the
knowledge-generating and incentive-inducing influences of competition, were able to respond significantly faster than FEMA. The private
companies managed to get supplies to where they were needed almost
directly following the storm. Before Hurricane Katrina even made landfall, both chains had preemptively placed trucks, drivers, and supplies
at strategic staging points, out of danger but close enough to rush in supplies right after the storm passed. Wal-Mart, using its efficient supply
chain, was able to get all but 15 of 89 damaged stores up and running
within 10 days, supplying needed items to Katrina survivors. Within the
first three weeks after the storm hit, Wal-Mart delivered almost 2,500
truckloads of supplies to the affected areas, while Home Depot deliv-
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ered over 800 truckloads. Both organizations left local store managers
with discretion so they could respond to local emergency situations.
Several Wal-Mart managers were commended for providing free supplies to devastated survivors of the storm.
Churches and private charity organizations also played an important
role in the recovery process following Hurricane Katrina. ChamleeWright and Storr (2008b, 2009) do an in-depth cultural analysis of a
Vietnamese-American community in New Orleans East, finding that
the Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church played a central role in the
revival of the neighborhood surrounding the church. One of the most
surprising features of their study is that the church is located in one of
the most damaged areas of New Orleans, one that the Urban Land Institute claimed had little chance of recovery. Within a few weeks after the
storm, parishioners were returning and taking the initial steps towards
recovery. An astounding 90 percent of the residents around the church
had returned by summer 2007, and 70 of the 75 Vietnamese-owned area
businesses were up and running. Even compared to less-damaged areas,
this was a remarkable recovery.

CONCLUSION
The destruction and upheaval caused by nature’s fury are often
staggering. Throughout history, unfettered people have been able to
overcome the worst tragedies of nature and war, displaying the amazing
resilience and ingenuity of humankind. However, when governments
impede the very process that allows the rapidity and completeness of
recovery, civil society must overcome human folly as well as nature’s
fury. Placing additional regulatory obstacles and destabilizing programs
in the way of entrepreneurs severely compromises the ability of private
actors to coordinate a complete and rapid recovery.
It was civil society that forged the way in coordinating a postKatrina recovery. Entrepreneurs were able to overcome the obstacles
created by the hurricane itself and by problematic government regulation in order to provide the basic goods and services necessary to
jump-start the recovery process. It was the initial commitments under-
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taken by businesses and private organizations, as well as the civilizing
influence of the reestablishment of commerce, that attracted residents
back to New Orleans, demonstrating, once again, the amazing resilience of civil society in overcoming nature’s fury.

Notes
1. This corruption persisted even after Katrina hit, when the levee board president
used the tragedy of Katrina to hand out lucrative contracts to family members,
including his wife’s cousin and her son, and even cut himself a check that was
$98,000 above the normal stipend (Horne 2006).
2. The parishes of Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines dispute the 2008 figures,
claiming that the U.S. Census Bureau has understated these numbers (GNOCDC
2008). If undisputed 2007 figures are used instead of the 2008 figures, then the
total population of the New Orleans MSA had reached 85 percent of pre-Katrina
levels by July 2007.
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The Socioeconomic
Impact of Tornadoes
Daniel Sutter
University of Texas–Pan American
Kevin M. Simmons
Austin College
Tornadoes are nature’s most powerful and destructive storms, capable of producing winds in excess of 300 miles per hour, yet they
are notoriously capricious, leveling one home and leaving the next undamaged. The United States experiences more than 1,200 tornadoes per
year, and since 1900 over 15,000 lives have been lost in tornadoes. The
deadliest tornado in U.S. history, the 1925 Tri-State Tornado, tracked
across three states and killed 695 persons, devastating entire towns.
Tornadoes have occupied a place in the national consciousness at least
since the 1939 movie The Wizard of Oz, when a Kansas twister blew
Dorothy and Toto to Oz. Every spring thousands of people spend weeks
trekking across the Plains chasing tornadoes.
How can economists or social scientists contribute to our knowledge of tornadoes? While cloud dynamics and the technical properties
of weather radars are outside these fields, economics can help us understand the impact of tornadoes on society. Economics can provide
relevant evidence on several issues related to societal impacts:
• Have tornadoes become less deadly over time?
• If so, how much have the efforts of the National Weather Service
(NWS) contributed to this?
• What measures offer the greatest potential to reduce casualties in a
cost-effective manner?

103

104 Sutter and Simmons

An understanding of the causes is necessary to reduce the impacts
of severe weather. Just as physicians must understand the causes of illness to successfully treat patients, meteorologists require information
about societal impacts. Attempts to reduce casualties not founded on
solid analysis could prove unsuccessful or incur excessive costs.
Tornadoes also provide evidence on some questions of significance
to policymakers:
• People sometimes have difficulty making sense of small risks of
death and either overestimate or underestimate these risks (Camerer
and Kunreuther 1989; McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey 1993). Is
misperception of risk a problem with tornadoes?
• Can an economic model of information help us understand peoples’
reactions to hazard warnings?
• How prevalent is underpreparation for natural hazards? Hurricane
Katrina has raised the issue of poor societal preparation for hazards
to high salience for policy (Meyer 2006).
Because of the broad reach of tornadoes (they have occurred in all
states), their impacts depend on the preparations and actions of essentially all Americans, a fact that underscores the importance of evidence
regarding these events.
This chapter analyzes the impact of tornadoes on the United States
and is organized as follows. The next section reviews the aggregate
impact of tornadoes on the nation, including three main components: 1)
the cost of casualties, 2) the value of property damaged or destroyed,
and 3) the cost of responding to tornado warnings. Overall the monetized cost of tornadoes is $4.6 billion per year. We then discuss findings
on the determinants of tornado casualties, and we use these findings to
analyze how the impacts might be reduced. The final section offers a
brief conclusion.

THE SOCIETAL COST OF TORNADOES
Tornadoes threaten life and limb, and they damage and destroy
property. Tornado warnings are also costly, because people must dis-
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rupt their daily activities to take shelter during a tornado warning. To
provide perspective on the impact of tornadoes, we monetize the value
of casualties, damages, and sheltering costs, based on U.S. averages for
1996–2006. Damage is the easiest to monetize, and we use inflationadjusted property damage as reported by the NWS, which averaged
$1.07 billion annually (in 2007 dollars).1 Note that 1996–2006 included
the tornado with the greatest reported damage in U.S. history, the May
3, 1999, Oklahoma City F5 tornado.2
A total of 645 tornado fatalities occurred between 1996 and 2006,
or 58.6 per year. Comparing fatalities with damage requires application of a dollar figure for the lives lost. The value of a statistical life
as revealed in market trade-offs constitutes a reasonable way to value
lives for such public policy purposes.3 We use the value of a statistical
life applied by the Environmental Protection Agency in a benefit-cost
analysis of the Clean Air Act (EPA 1997). The EPA used a figure of
$4.8 million in 1990 dollars, based on a meta-analysis of dozens of
published studies. Adjusting this value for inflation yields a value of
$7.6 million in 2007 dollars. The monetized value of tornado fatalities
is thus $445 million per year.
Tornadoes injured an average of 999 persons annually. Values of
statistical injuries have been developed using market data, and the EPA
(1997) has applied monetary values for a variety of injuries. A difficulty
arises in applying existing values to tornado injuries due to a dearth
of information on the distribution of the severity of tornado injuries.
Epidemiological studies in the aftermath of selected tornadoes provide
some evidence on the severity of injuries, which overall are not very severe. Brown et al. (2002), for example, found that 76 percent of injuries
in the May 3, 1999, Oklahoma tornado outbreak did not require hospitalization and that the average hospital stay was seven days. Carter,
Millson, and Allen (1989) found that 83 percent of injuries in the May
31, 1985, Ontario, Canada, tornado outbreak were minor, with an average hospital stay of 12.5 days. Given this evidence, we follow Merrell,
Simmons, and Sutter (2005) and use a value of a statistical injury equal
to 1 percent of the value of a statistical life, or $76,000. The monetary
value of injuries is then $76 million per year.
We turn next to the cost of tornado warnings, that is, the value of
time spent under warnings. Although taking cover during a tornado
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warning can save lives, the disruption of business or leisure activities
is costly. Between 1996 and 2004, the NWS issued around 3,500 warnings per year, which were in effect for an average of 41 minutes each.4
We use the U.S. Census estimated population of the warned county
and the duration of each warning to estimate person-hours spent under
warnings. The average warned county had a population of 98,000, so
an average of 234 million person-hours were spent under warnings annually. For members of the workforce, the hourly wage measures the
opportunity cost of time. We use the average civilian nonfarm hourly
wage of $17.42 in 2007 (BLS 2007) to value employed persons’ time
lost, and we value the time of individuals who are not employed, 52
percent of the population, at half this amount. The weighted average
value of time is $12.89, and the annual value of time spent under warnings is $3.02 billion.
Table 6.1 summarizes the impacts of tornadoes quantified here. The
cost is $4.6 billion per year, and the value of time spent under warnings
accounts for nearly two-thirds of this total, property damage 23 percent, fatalities at just under 10 percent, and injuries less than 2 percent.
Note that this total does not include societal impacts, such as business
interruption, alternative living expenses, and external, community-wide
impacts. Although tornado impacts on a metropolitan area are modest,
major tornadoes can significantly impact small communities. In April
2007, a tornado heavily damaged the business district of Tulia, Texas
(population 4,700). The town’s only grocery store never reopened after
the tornado, leaving residents with a 60-mile round trip drive to Amarillo for grocery shopping (Martinez and Ewing 2008).
Readers might find the large contribution of time under warnings
to the total impact of tornadoes surprising. One way to put the costs of
warnings in perspective is to consider how the cost of tornadoes would
have differed in the 1920s. Brooks and Doswell (2002) estimate that
the U.S. tornado fatality rate fell from 1.8 per million residents then to
0.11 per million in 2000. If the higher 1920s rate occurred today, the
nation would experience an average of 960 fatalities per year, not the
59 actually observed since 1996. Applying the $7.6 million value of
a statistical life yields a cost of fatalities of $7.3 billion annually; the
NWS did not issue warnings in the 1920s, so there is no basis for comparing cost of time spent under warnings. The lethality of tornadoes has
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Table 6.1 Annual Impact of Tornadoes
Monetized value
Impact
Amount
($ millions)
Property damage
—
1,070
Fatalities
58.6
445
Injuries
999
76
Time under
234 million
3,020
warnings
person-hours
Total
4,610

% of monetized
impact
23.2
9.7
1.6
65.5
100.0

NOTE: Damage and casualties are averages for 1996–2006, time under warnings an
average for 1996–2004. The valuation of lives lost, injuries, and time under warnings
is discussed in the text.
SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) tornado
fatality location data, available from the NOAA by permission.

been so greatly reduced that responding to warnings now represents the
largest part of the cost of tornadoes. The total cost is substantially lower
today because tornadoes are less deadly.

WHAT ARE THE DETERMINANTS OF
TORNADO CASUALTIES?
An analysis of tornado casualties reveals several significant patterns
discussed in this section. The figures cited are from a regression analysis of tornado fatalities and injuries from 1986 to 2004. The data set has
been constructed by the authors using the Storm Prediction Center’s
(SPC) national tornado archive, the NWS’s tornado warning verification records, and U.S. Census data.5 The unit of observation is the state
tornado segment, because the SPC archive reports separate entries for
multistate tornadoes. For simplicity we will usually just say tornadoes
and not state tornado segments in the text. Appendix 6A discusses the
details of the regression model and precise variable definitions, and
Table 6A.1 reports the full results.
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Most Tornadoes Are Not Killers
Only 347 of the almost 21,000 tornadoes in our data set resulted in
one or more fatalities, and 1,988 resulted in one or more injuries. That
is, 98 percent of tornadoes had no fatalities, and 91 percent caused no
injuries. The risk to life and limb posed by tornadoes is quite concentrated in powerful storms. The most powerful tornadoes are rated F4 or
F5 on the Fujita scale of tornado damage.6 Nine of the ten F5 tornadoes
and 42 percent of F4 tornadoes between 1986 and 2004 killed at least
one person, and these tornadoes accounted for 43 percent of fatalities.
The 41 tornadoes that resulted in five or more fatalities (less than 0.2
percent of the total) accounted for half of all fatalities.
Tornadoes rated F3 or stronger are much more likely to result in fatalities or injuries. Table 6.2, constructed from the regression analysis,
reports fatalities and injuries by tornadoes of different F-scale ratings
relative to an F0 tornado. Expected fatalities are about 27,000 times
more likely with an F5 tornado than with an F0, and injuries are almost
2,000 times more likely in F5 tornadoes. Both fatalities and injuries
increase fairly consistently with each F-scale category increase.
Location, Location, Location
Many observers have noted the vulnerability of mobile homes to tornadoes (American Meteorological Society 1997; Brooks and Doswell
2002; Golden and Adams 2000; Golden and Snow 1991). Figure 6.1 reports tornado fatalities by location as tracked by the NWS for the years
Table 6.2 Tornado Casualties by Fujita Scale Rating
F-scale category
Fatalities
F1
15
F2
105
F3
545
F4
2,644
F5
26,630

Injuries
11
65
178
692
1,808

NOTE: The values in the table are the ratio of expected fatalities or injuries in a tornado
of each F-scale category rating relative to an otherwise equivalent F0 tornado.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 6.1 Tornado Fatalities by Location (%)
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from NOAA tornado fatality location data.

1985–2007.7 More fatalities occurred in mobile homes (43 percent)
than any other location. Permanent homes, which include single-family
homes and apartments, rank second at 31 percent, followed by vehicles
at 9 percent, schools and churches, businesses, and outdoor or other
locations at about 5 percent each. The proportion of fatalities in manufactured homes is disproportionately high. These structures constituted
only 7.6 percent of U.S. housing units in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau
2000), but the fatality rate for manufactured homes is at least ten times
that of permanent homes. Regression analysis confirms the dependence
of casualties on the housing stock. An increase of one standard deviation in mobile homes as a proportion of county housing units increases
expected fatalities by 36 percent and expected injuries by 26 percent.
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Timing Matters
Timing significantly affects casualties, including time of day, day
of the week, and month of the year. Tornadoes during the evening and
overnight hours are significantly more likely to kill or injure people.
Figure 6.2 reports an index for casualties by time of day based on
the regression analysis. We divide the day into five time periods, the
overnight hours (midnight to 6 a.m.), morning (6 a.m. to noon), early
afternoon (noon to 4 p.m.), late afternoon (4 p.m. to 8 p.m.), and late
evening (8 p.m. to midnight). The index sets fatalities and injuries from
an early afternoon tornado equal to 100, and represents casualties from
tornadoes at other times relative to an early afternoon tornado. Fatalities
for overnight tornadoes exceed those of early afternoon tornadoes by a
factor of nearly 2.5 and those for late evening tornadoes by a factor of
Figure 6.2 Time of Day and Tornado Casualties
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the NWS Storm Prediction Center’s tornado archive.
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more than 2. A similar pattern is observed for injuries, but the amplitude
of the time of day effects are not as great; injuries are 43 percent and 32
percent higher overnight and in the late evening, respectively, than for
a comparable early afternoon tornado.
Tornado casualties also vary widely by month. Figure 6.3 presents
an index of fatalities and injuries by month derived from the regression analysis. The index equals 100 for both fatalities and injuries in
February, the month with the deadliest tornadoes. The difference in
lethality across months is quite substantial, as a tornado in February
yields more than 14 times the fatalities of an otherwise equal tornado
in July. Tornadoes are less deadly in the spring and summer months
(with the exception of August) than tornadoes in the late fall or winter.
Injuries exhibit the same basic pattern, except that again the variation
is substantially less than for fatalities (injuries in January tornadoes exceed those in May tornadoes by a factor of 2.5). The low casualty rates
Figure 6.3 Tornado Casualties by Month
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in May, June, and July benefit the nation, since these months have the
largest numbers of tornadoes, while the high lethality in November,
December, January, and February applies to relatively few tornadoes.
Although a difference in intensity of storms not fully captured by the
F-scale variables may be thought to drive the result, the strongest tornadoes occur in the spring months. Hours of darkness might explain some
of the variation over months, because tornadoes that occur after dark
are more dangerous (see Ashley, Knmenec, and Schwantes 2008, who
control for the exact time of sunset). But variation in casualties across
months is much greater than the variation across the day, so darkness
probably cannot explain much of the variation over the year. Surprise
might drive this result; residents may not expect tornadoes during the
winter, and thus are not alert for and ready to respond to a warning.
In contrast, during the spring residents might suspect that an ominous
thunderstorm could produce a tornado. Surprise would need to affect
warning responses, since the regressions control for tornado warnings.
The day of the week also affects fatalities. Intuition suggests that
casualties might be higher on either weekends or weekdays. On weekends people might be busy with recreation and leisure activities and
not closely following the weather and weather warnings, while weekday tornadoes could occur during evening rush hour traffic jams. The
regression analysis finds that weekend tornadoes are more dangerous:
expected fatalities and injuries are 40 percent and 8 percent higher,
respectively, than for tornadoes during the week, although only the fatalities result attains statistical significance.
The Efforts of the National Weather Service
Protecting persons is part of the mission of the NWS, and tornado
warnings have been issued since the 1950s to try to reduce casualties
(Doswell, Moller, and Brooks 1999). The NWS installed WSR-88D
(Doppler) radars at Weather Forecast Offices (WFOs) across the country between 1992 and 1997. The radars, adapted from military use,
allow much better resolution of wind fields in severe storms. Viewers of
weather coverage on television are probably familiar with the Doppler
radar image of the “hook echo” of a tornado. Simmons and Sutter (2005)
analyzed the effect of Doppler radar on tornado warnings and casualties
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by using the radar installation date for each WFO to determine which
tornadoes occurred after installation of the new radars. Over the period
from 1986 to 1999, Doppler radar increased the percentage of storms
warned for from 35 to 60 percent and the mean lead time from 5.3 to 9.5
minutes; it also reduced the percentage of false alarm warnings from
79 to 76 percent. The new radars also reduced expected fatalities by 45
percent and expected injuries by 40 percent. We update the casualties
analysis with these regressions, including more years of tornadoes and
more county-level control variables.
We also investigate the role of tornado warnings on casualties. Specifically, we focus on whether a longer lead time reduces casualties, or
whether instead there is an optimal lead time for a warning. Although
responding to a tornado warning does not take long, for example, in
contrast with evacuation for a hurricane, issuing the warning is just
one part of the warning process. The warning must be disseminated to
residents in harm’s way via television, radio, tornado sirens, the Internet, or other channels, including phone calls from friends or relatives.
Dissemination takes time, creating a need for longer lead times. We
can determine from NWS tornado warning verification records whether
each tornado was warned for or not. We have explored several ways to
model warnings, including an indicator variable for whether a warning
was issued for the tornado and the lead time on the warning in minutes
(Simmons and Sutter 2008a). Here we focus on a set of dummy variables for lead times in the ranges of 1 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 20, 21
to 30, and 31 or more minutes. The lead time is specifically the number
of minutes between the time the warning was issued and the beginning
of the tornado.8 Creating intervals allows the marginal effect of lead
time to vary in a possibly irregular manner.
Figure 6.4 presents the effect of lead time on fatalities and injuries.
We again use an index to display the effect, with the index set equal
to 100 for tornadoes with no warning or a warning lead time of zero
minutes. An index value less than 100 indicates that lead time reduces
casualties. Tornado warnings reduce injuries at all lead time intervals,
with the largest reductions occurring in the 11 to 15 and 31+ minute
intervals—42 percent and 44 percent, respectively. The reductions in
injuries in the other lead time intervals range from 23 to 33 percent, and
although the lead time variables are statistically significant, the differ-
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Figure 6.4 Warning Lead Time and Casualties
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the NWS Storm Prediction Center’s tornado archive.

ences between the intervals are not generally statistically significant.
Thus warnings reduce injuries, but the marginal effect of lead time is
essentially zero after 15 minutes.
The situation is different for fatalities. Lead times up to 15 minutes
reduce fatalities by 19 percent, 51 percent, and 31 percent in the 1 to
5, 6 to 10, and 11 to 15 minute intervals, respectively. But lead times
greater than 15 minutes increase fatalities relative to no warning, and by
a sizable (and statistically significant) amount: 57 percent, 49 percent,
and 11 percent for the 16 to 20, 21 to 30, and 31+ minute intervals,
respectively. Some of these fatalities may occur because residents react to long lead times by taking actions that increase their risk relative
to those taken when there is no warning. In addition, long lead times
sometimes result when a warning is issued but not canceled and a tor-
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nado eventually occurs in the warning area; residents may not consider
that such warnings convey the same degree of risk as those issued for an
imminent tornado. As Simmons and Sutter (2008a) discuss, the increase
in fatalities for long lead times reflects a handful of well-warned-of and
particularly deadly tornadoes. A contributing factor is that powerful tornadoes tend to occur during large tornado outbreaks, and consequently
are well warned of. We do not observe how many fatalities might result
if the most powerful tornadoes occurred without warning. Furthermore,
the warnings for some of these killer tornadoes may not have been
disseminated to residents. For example, consider the 1987 Saragosa,
Texas, tornado, which had a lead time of 22 minutes and resulted in 30
deaths. As Aguirre (1988) discusses, the fatalities occurred in an immigrant community where residents watched Spanish-language television
networks that did not broadcast the warning, and thus they were effectively unwarned about the tornado.
While tornado warnings alert residents to danger, most warnings,
because they are issued in advance of the tornado, turn out to be false
alarms. The national false alarm ratio (FAR) was 0.744 in 2004, meaning that tornadoes did not occur in the warned county in three out of
four cases. When warnings do not come to pass, the cry-wolf effect
might apply: that is, residents might dismiss future warnings as false
alarms, reducing the effectiveness of warnings that do precede tornadoes. A higher FAR reduces the value of the information contained in
warnings, and should at some point reduce warning response. Yet a
false alarm effect has been difficult to uncover: Barnes et al. (2007) find
that “evidence for the cry-wolf effect in natural hazards research . . . has
not been forthcoming” (p. 1142).
The extensive NWS tornado warning verification records allow
a careful test of the effect of false alarms on tornado casualties, and
by implication warning response. A complication arises because false
alarms are nonevents, while tornadoes are events. It is not clear which
tornado warnings, as regards both false alarms and verified warnings,
should apply to constructing an FAR for different tornado events. If
all warnings nationwide apply to all tornadoes, there will be no crosssectional variation in FARs, and we would be forced to try to disentangle the effect of changes in the national FAR from a time trend. Warning
performance, however, varies substantially across the nation as well as
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over time, and thus we use local, recent warnings to calculate an FAR
in our analysis. Specifically, we use warnings issued in the state struck
by a tornado over the previous 12 months to calculate an FAR that we
use as a control variable in our regression analysis.9
We find strong evidence of a false alarm effect, consistent with
economic models of the value of information. A higher state FAR significantly increases both fatalities and injuries. An increase of one standard
deviation in the FAR (which is 0.117) increases expected fatalities by
10 percent and injuries by 9 percent. The national FAR declined after
the NWS installed Doppler weather radars, so some of the reduction in
casualties attributed above to Doppler radar (perhaps 10–20 percent of
the 30–45 percent reduction) appears to have resulted from decreased
false alarms. We have also calculated recent, local FARs using NWS
Weather Forecast Office County Warning Areas and TV markets as defined by the A. C. Nielsen Company over one- and two-year intervals
for robustness. We find a similar false alarm effect using these alternative FAR definitions (Simmons and Sutter 2009).
The dependence of casualties on time of day may constitute indirect
evidence of the effectiveness of tornado warnings. Tornado warnings
help reduce casualties only if people respond to them, and residents are
probably less likely to receive warnings issued at night when they are
asleep. Thus some portion of the lower fatalities and injuries for daytime tornadoes may be due to the lifesaving effects of tornado warnings.
The Demographics of Tornado Vulnerability
Economists have found that safety is generally a normal or luxury
good: as people become wealthier and secure the necessities of life,
they look to reduce risks of premature death. For natural hazards,
Hurricane Katrina highlighted the converse of this proposition, the vulnerability of low-income households. Recent research has documented
a negative relationship between income and natural hazards fatalities
across countries (Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register 2005; Kahn 2005).
Higher-income households could reduce tornado risk in several ways:
by purchasing higher-quality homes (or not residing in manufactured
homes), installing in-home tornado shelters, and purchasing NOAA
weather radios or other emergency alert systems. Wealthier communi-
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ties might be more likely to invest in tornado sirens and emergency
management and emergency medical services.
Yet county-level income does not appear to reduce tornado fatalities or injuries. Our previous research (Simmons and Sutter 2005,
2008a) has shown that tornado paths through areas with higher median
incomes have significantly greater fatalities and injuries, contrary to
expectations. We include extra control variables in the regressions reported here, and the statistical significance of income is diminished,
although an increase of one standard deviation in median income still
increases expected fatalities and injuries by 8 to 9 percent. The income
effect we found previously may be due to urbanization. Our previous
and current regressions include population density, which as we would
expect increases casualties since the number of persons in the path
of a tornado affects the likelihood of casualties. Our regressions here
also include the rural proportion of county population, as characterized
by the Census Bureau; a larger rural population significantly reduces
both fatalities and injuries. Urban areas have higher incomes than rural
areas, and so the positive effect of income on casualties may be a residual consequence of a population effect.
Tornadoes seem to run counter to several other common elements
of natural hazards vulnerability. The elderly are considered an at-risk
population, and this vulnerability might be particularly acute for tornadoes, as the elderly may have difficulty hearing sirens or an approaching
tornado and quickly moving to shelter without assistance. Yet a larger
proportion of county residents over age 65 are associated with significantly reduced fatalities and injuries. Injuries also decrease with larger
portions of residents under 18 and male residents. Poverty is normally
associated with greater vulnerability, and here we have mixed evidence:
an increased county poverty rate increases (although not significantly)
expected fatalities and reduces expected injuries. But poverty likely affects the propensity of a household to live in manufactured housing,
and this definitely increases vulnerability. Education is also related to
vulnerability. A low level of education as indicated by the proportion of
residents over age 25 who did not graduate from high school increases
both fatalities and injuries. But the proportion of persons with a fouryear college degree does not affect casualties. Long commuting times
might also affect vulnerability to tornadoes, particularly since many tor-
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nadoes occur during the evening rush hour. We find some evidence of
the vulnerability of commuters, as a higher proportion of residents with
a commute over 30 minutes significantly increases fatalities but does
not affect injuries.

HOW MIGHT TORNADO IMPACTS BE REDUCED?
Our analysis of tornado impacts can assist in evaluating alternatives for reducing impacts. Economics provides numerous examples of
policies that fail to achieve their goal or even have unintended negative
consequences. Several options exist for trying to reduce tornado impacts, and our analysis can help evaluate the comparative advantages
and possible interactions between these alternatives. Based on our analysis we offer four insights on reducing tornado impacts. Note that the
potential gain in reduced casualties from one measure falls when other
measures are simultaneously employed. For example, the United States
currently experiences about 60 tornado fatalities per year. A measure
that reduces fatalities by 25 percent would currently save about 15 lives
per year. If another measure first reduces fatalities to 40 per year, the 25
percent reduction in fatalities now saves 10 lives per year, and so the
benefits of the measure fall by one-third. Thus our statements about potential casualty reductions are all based on recent casualties and assume
no other measures are employed.
Tornado Warnings
As previously discussed, the value of time spent under warnings
represents a significant portion of the societal cost of tornadoes. A recent NWS innovation will significantly reduce the amount of time spent
under warnings. The NWS introduced Storm Based Warnings (SBWs)
for tornadoes (and other types of severe weather) nationwide in October
2007. SBWs warn for a polygon area near the tornado circulation, not
an entire county. In tests the new warnings reduced the area warned by
70 to 75 percent compared with county warnings, with no compromise
of safety since residents actually at risk from the possible tornado are
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still warned (Looney 2006; Jacks and Ferree 2007). The new warnings
will significantly benefit society, although the savings of time sheltering
depends on how many people actually responded to county warnings.
Assuming a 50 percent response rate to county warnings and a 70 percent reduction in warned area, SBWs will reduce the value of time spent
sheltering by $1 billion per year (Sutter and Erickson, forthcoming).
SBWs could help reduce tornado casualties as well, since more precise
and hence valuable information in the new warnings should improve
response. Counties are large relative to tornado damage paths: the area
of the typical county struck by tornadoes is about 1,000 square miles,
compared to a mean tornado damage area of 0.3 square miles.10 Thus
the old county warnings provided relatively little detail on the location of a possible tornado. By conveying a higher level of risk for the
warned area, SBWs might make residents more likely to abandon a
manufactured home, as the NWS recommends, and increase the value
of NOAA weather radios and commercial emergency alert systems. The
technology exists to convey even more precise information on the location of a tornado—for instance, through street-level storm tracking
currently provided by some television stations.
Improved lead time for unwarned tornadoes can also reduce casualties. An optimal warning lead time reduces fatalities and injuries by 50
percent and 42 percent, respectively, relative to no warning. Between
2000 and 2004, 46 percent of tornadoes occurred with a warning lead
time of five minutes or less. These tornadoes are underwarned for, in
that our analysis shows that longer lead times should reduce casualties.
Optimal warning for these tornadoes would reduce fatalities and injuries
by an additional 21 percent and 15 percent, respectively. Given current
warning technology, these tornadoes could not be warned for without
increasing the FAR, and that would increase casualties. Improving lead
time performance without increasing the FAR would require new technology or algorithms that shift the trade-off between detection and false
alarms (see Brooks 2004 for a depiction of this trade-off).
On the other hand, we find no evidence that increasing lead times
beyond 15 minutes would benefit society. In fact, longer lead times
perversely result in more fatalities than a tornado without a warning.
Although we think that this result may be anomalous, it does not follow
that we would be likely to find a further reduction in fatalities beyond
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that observed in the 6 to 10 minute interval. And for injuries the marginal
benefit of lead time beyond the 11 to 15 minute interval is essentially
zero. This diminishing return probably occurs because residents can respond to a tornado warning—take cover in an interior room or storm
shelter if available—quite quickly. Time is needed to disseminate a
warning, but our results suggest that everyone who is likely to receive
a warning has received it within 10 or 15 minutes. Thus our analysis of
casualties leads us to expect that increased lead times beyond 15 minutes would not yield significant benefits to society.
Tornado Shelters: Rarely Cost-Effective
Engineers have designed above-ground safe rooms and belowground shelters capable of protecting residents from even the strongest
tornadoes. Below-ground shelters retail for $2,000 to $2,500, while safe
rooms cost in excess of $5,000. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) included tornado shelters in its National Mitigation Strategy in the 1990s and issued performance criteria for shelters
(FEMA 1999). FEMA and the state of Oklahoma collaborated on the
Oklahoma Saferoom Initiative to provide rebates to homeowners installing a shelter or safe room.
The evidence suggests that tornado shelters are not a cost-effective
way to reduce permanent home casualties. Merrell, Simmons, and Sutter (2005) and Simmons and Sutter (2006) calculated the cost per life
saved for shelters using historical casualties, predicted casualties from
a regression model, and casualties per home struck by tornadoes. All
three methods yield fairly consistent estimates for permanent homes;
for instance, the cost per life saved in Oklahoma, at the heart of Tornado
Alley, was over $50 million, which greatly exceeds market-revealed
values of a statistical life (typically under $10 million). We illustrate the
arithmetic with the historical fatality totals for Oklahoma, which experienced 263 tornado fatalities between 1950 and 2007, or 4.5 per year.
In-home shelters can be expected to prevent only the 31 percent of fatalities that occur in permanent homes (see Figure 6.1). If all permanent
home fatalities could be prevented, shelters would prevent 1.4 deaths
per year.11 The cost of equipping all of the more than one million singlefamily homes in the state with a shelter (at $2,000 per shelter) is over
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$2 billion. The resulting cost per life saved in this calculation is $57
million. As another way of understanding this result, 55 percent of permanent home fatalities occur in F4 and F5 tornadoes. Violent tornadoes
occur too infrequently even in Tornado Alley to justify economically
such an expenditure, regardless of the potentially fatal consequences.
Hardening targets is an ineffective way to reduce permanent home
fatalities.
Reducing Manufactured Home Vulnerability
Reducing the vulnerability of manufactured homes is crucial to reducing tornado casualties. Although tornado shelters are unlikely to be
cost-effective in permanent homes, the cost per life saved for mobile
homes is less than $10 million in the most tornado-prone states. And the
cost per life saved could be even lower with cost-sharing for shelters in
manufactured home parks. Schmidlin, Hammer, and Knabe (2001) report that manufactured home parks do in fact offer community shelters
as an amenity for residents. Simmons and Sutter (2007) find that lots
in parks in Oklahoma with shelters rent at a 5 percent premium, which
approximately covers the cost of a community shelter as estimated by
FEMA (2000). Thus tornado shelters may help with the mobile home
problem, but they are only part of the answer, and will be less effective
for the majority of homes not located in a park.
Manufactured homes can also be made more wind-resistant. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1994 amended the
HUD code for manufactured housing to include wind load requirements
in areas subject to high winds. Although intended to reduce hurricanerelated damage (to which end the rule has been effective; see Grosskopf
2005), the wind load provisions appear to reduce tornado risk as well.
Simmons and Sutter (2008b) examined the aftermath of the February
2007 tornadoes in Lake County, Florida, which killed 21 persons, all in
manufactured homes. A key factor in fatalities was whether the home
was totally leveled, as characterized by county officials: 16 of the 17
fatalities for which home condition could be ascertained occurred in
leveled homes. Manufactured homes built to the wind load provisions
were 79 percent less likely to be leveled than homes built before the
HUD code went into effect. No fatalities could be documented in the
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newer homes, and the reduction in the probability of a home being leveled implies that in time fatalities could be reduced by as much as 70
percent. Of course, whether these results extrapolate to other tornadoes
(either stronger or weaker) is an open question, but improved construction may help mitigate the mobile home problem.
Tornadoes after Dark
Tornadoes are significantly more dangerous at night than during the
day. Casualties could be reduced if the lethality of nighttime tornadoes
could be brought in line with tornadoes during the day. Between 1986
and 2004, 177 and 116 fatalities and 2,871 and 2,217 injuries occurred
in late evening (8 p.m.–midnight) and overnight (midnight–6 a.m.) tornadoes, respectively. If these tornadoes were only as dangerous as early
afternoon tornadoes, 155 fatalities and 1,308 injuries would have been
avoided. Overall this would reduce fatalities by 16 percent and injuries
by 7 percent.
A strategy to reduce this vulnerability depends on exactly why
nighttime tornadoes are so lethal, which is an area of ongoing research.
Three alternative explanations seem plausible. First, the warning process might be less effective for nighttime tornadoes. That is, fewer
people might receive these warnings because they happen to be asleep,
as mentioned above. Second, and closely related, the response to nighttime warnings could differ. For instance, people might seek visual
confirmation of a tornado before reacting, and the difficulty of seeing
tornadoes at night might make people less likely to respond. Finally, the
nighttime effect might be a consequence of the greater vulnerability of
manufactured homes, since residents are more likely to be at home at
night than during the day.12 If the vulnerability to tornadoes after dark is
due to less effective warnings, emergency alert systems or more refined
warnings might reduce this vulnerability. If nighttime fatalities are an
extension of the mobile home problem, the HUD wind load provisions
or tornado shelters in mobile home parks might address the problem.
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CONCLUSION
Our investigation has identified several aspects of the distribution
of tornado casualties and the relative likelihood of casualties. A handful
of powerful (F3 or stronger) tornadoes, often clustered on super tornado
outbreak days, account for a large fraction of total casualties. But the
distribution of fatalities or injuries by F-scale does not tell us in which
category society could most easily reduce casualties. We have found
that tornadoes that strike mobile homes or after dark or on weekends or
during the fall or winter months produce more casualties. If casualties
in these circumstances could be reduced to the comparable rate in permanent homes for weekday tornadoes during the spring season, the toll
from tornadoes would be reduced considerably. But overall casualties
are not currently the largest component of the societal cost of tornadoes.
Because tornadoes have become less deadly over the years, property
damage and the cost of responding to warnings now account for the
bulk of their societal impact. The introduction of Storm Based Warnings by the NWS will reduce time spent under warnings by perhaps 70
percent.
Our quantitative, large data set analysis also reveals some promising directions for qualitative, survey, or case study analysis. Large data
set statistical analysis excels at identifying patterns in vulnerability but
does not necessarily allow us to pinpoint the cause of the vulnerability.
A relatively small number of tornadoes account for many of the fatalities and injuries that drive our regression results; detailed case studies
could help reveal whether special circumstances or details about the
dissemination of warnings not readily captured by control variables
contributed to the loss of life. Future qualitative research could help
to address some of the casualty disparities. For instance, surveys could
explore whether people respond differently to tornadoes at night or during the fall and winter months. Additional quantitative and qualitative
research will be needed to reduce the societal impacts of tornadoes in a
cost-effective manner.
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Notes
We are grateful for continued financial support from NOAA’s National Severe
Storms Laboratory, the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, and the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado.
1. Information on property damage, and on injuries and fatalities resulting from tornadoes in the following paragraphs, is from NOAA’s National Weather Service
Storm Prediction Center (SPC) Historical Severe Storm Database, http://www.spc
.noaa.gov/wcm/index.html#data.
2. Brooks and Doswell (2001) present damage totals for past tornadoes adjusted for
inflation, population growth, and changes in national wealth. The May 3, 1999, F5
tornado ranks eleventh in their adjusted damage calculations.
3. For a discussion of the concept of a statistical life and a survey of estimates from
the market, see Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington (2000).
4. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Tornado Warning
Verification Archive (StormDat), available from NOAA by permission.
5. The SPC archive can be accessed online at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/archive.
6. The Fujita scale rates tornado damage from F0 (weakest) to F5 (strongest). An F0
is a minimal tornado that causes light damage; an F5 tornado causes “incredible”
damage, including well-built homes swept off their foundations and cars thrown
more than 100 meters. A description of the Fujita scale and the Enhanced Fujita
scale can be found at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/f-scale.html.
7. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Tornado Fatality Locations, available from NOAA by permission.
8. By convention, the NWS counts a case where a tornado warning is issued after the
tornado is on the ground as a warned tornado with a lead time of zero. We had previously separated out zero lead time tornadoes as an extra category, but the effect
of a zero lead time warning was very close to (and statistically indistinguishable
from) no warning.
9. These regressions omit tornadoes for which no warnings were issued in the state in
the prior 12 months, since the FAR in these instances is undefined.
10. Authors’ calculation using NOAA’s National Weather Service Storm Prediction
Center (SPC) Historical Severe Storm Database, http://www.spc.noaa.gov/wcm/
index.html#data.
11. And even then shelters would prevent all in-home fatalities only if residents always take shelter before the tornado hits.
12. Note that residual mobile home vulnerability could also explain the greater lethality of tornadoes on weekends.

Appendix 6A
The impacts on tornado casualties discussed throughout this chapter are
from a regression analysis of casualties. This appendix describes the details of
the regression models. Fatalities and injuries take on nonnegative integer values; that is, the number of persons killed in a tornado can equal 0, 1, 2, or more,
with a large number of zero observations. Ordinary least squares regression
fails to take into account the truncation of casualties at zero, and thus instead
a Poisson regression model is applied to this count data. The Poisson model
(Greene 2000, pp. 880–886) assumes that the dependent variable yi is drawn
from a Poisson distribution with parameter λi , or
Prob(Yi = yi) = e−λi × λiyi/yi!, yi = 0, 1, 2, . . .
The parameter λi of the distribution is assumed to be a log-linear function
of the independent variables xi, or ln(λi) = β′ × xi. The Poisson regression model
assumes equivalence of the conditional mean of yi and its variance; violation
of this condition is known as overdispersion. The negative binomial regression
model (Greene 2000, pp. 886–888), a generalization of the Poisson model, is
recommended when the data exhibit overdispersion. Diagnostic tests consistently indicate that injuries but not fatalities are overdispersed. Consequently
we estimate fatalities with Poisson models and injuries with negative binomial
models.
Our models include three categories of variables, describing characteristics of the tornado, the tornado path, and NWS efforts to reduce casualties.
The models also include, but we do not report, year dummy variables. The
year variables control for nationwide changes over time, such as the advent
of the Internet as a channel to communicate warnings, and any possible yearto-year variation in warning response. The tornado characteristic variables are
as described in the text, and model the rating of the tornado on the F-scale of
tornado damage, the time of day, month, and whether the tornado occurred on
a weekend. We also include the length of the damage path in miles.
The storm path variables control for the economic and demographic characteristics of the area struck by the tornado. The variable labels in Table 6A.1
are self-descriptive. The variables are constructed using census data for the
counties reported as in the storm path. For a tornado that struck more than one
county, the tornado path variables average the observations for each county in
the storm path. The path variables for a specific year are based on linear interpolation from the decennial censuses. For tornadoes after 2000, population
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density is calculated using the census annual population estimates, while other
variables use linear interpolation with county data from the 2006 American
Community Survey when available. Mobile homes as a proportion of housing
units by county was not reported in census publications prior to 1990, so for
1986–1989 tornadoes, the values from the 1990 census are used. We also include an interaction term between path length and population density, because
a long-track tornado through a highly populated area might affect casualties
differently from an increase in either of these variables separately.
The NWS variables are a dummy variable for tornadoes that occurred after installation of Doppler radar and tornado warning. The Doppler variable
equals 1 if the tornado occurred on or after the date on which Doppler radar
was installed in the NWS Weather Forecast Office with warning responsibility
for the first tornado in the storm’s path. Since warnings are issued by county,
a tornado that strikes several counties may yield several valid warnings. We
apply the warning for the first county in the storm path. The tornado warning
variables are dummy variables that indicate whether the lead time in minutes
for the warning (if any) for the first county in the storm path was in this interval. The False Alarm Ratio (FAR) variable is the proportion of warnings issued
in the state struck by the tornado in the prior 12 months that were false alarms
(i.e., that did not verify, as defined by the NWS). Table 6A.1 reports one specification of the casualties regressions with the Doppler radar variable but no
warning variables, and one specification with the warning variables but not the
Doppler variable. The Doppler radar specifications test for an impact of radar
installation on casualties, which could be due to better warning for tornadoes
or improved warning response.
Table 6A.1 reports the raw regression coefficients and standard errors. To
interpret the coefficients as discussed in the text, the antilog of the coefficient
must be taken. Thus to calculate the marginal effect of a dummy variable with
coefficient βk from the table, the percentage change in expected casualties is
100 × (exp[βk] − 1). The percentage change in expected casualties due to a one
standard deviation increase in variable k, σk , in variable k is 100 × (exp[βk × σk]
− 1). Note that for a set of mutually exclusive categories (F-scale categories,
day parts, months of the year), one of the dummy variable categories must be
omitted for the model to be estimated. The impact of the included variables is
then measured relative to that of a tornado in the excluded category: overnight
for day parts, July for month, and F0 for F-scale. Table 6A.1 also indicates
the statistical significance of each of the coefficient estimates at two different
levels, 10 percent and 1 percent, in a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that
the coefficient is zero.
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Table 6A.1 Regression Analysis of Tornado Fatalities and Injuries
Fatalities
(Doppler,
no warning)a
Doppler

Fatalities
(warning,
no Doppler)a

Injuries
(Doppler,
no warning)a

−0.354*
(0.240)

Injuries
(warning,
no Doppler)a
−0.581***
(0.174)

FAR

0.784*
(0.353)

0.702***
(0.262)

Lead 1–5 min.

−0.223*
(0.134)

−0.396***
(0.123)

Lead 6–10 min.

−0.727***
(0.145)

−0.363***
(0.119)

Lead 11–15 min.

−0.369*
(0.160)

−0.538***
(0.127)

Lead 16–20 min.

0.446***
(0.132)

−0.257*
(0.137)

Lead 21–30 min.

0.336***
(0.114)

−0.265*
(0.119)

Lead 31+ min.

0.0879
(0.134)

−0.582***
(0.124)

Morning

−0.808***
(0.174)

−0.903***
(0.174)

−0.0882
(0.144)

−0.0536
(0.140)

Early afternoon

−0.846***
(0.132)

−0.891***
(0.131)

−0.359***
(0.126)

−0.436***
(0.123)

Early evening

−0.664***
(0.124)

−0.592***
(0.121)

−0.323***
(0.121)

−0.386***
(0.118)

Late evening

−0.154
(0.133)

−0.147
(0.131)

−0.0816
(0.137)

−0.161
(0.134)

Weekend

0.334***
(0.0847)

0.313***
(0.0836)

0.0793
(0.0704)

0.0853
(0.0688)

January

1.45***
(0.391)

1.03***
(0.352)

0.521***
(0.192)

0.536***
(0.186)

February

2.70***
(0.366)

2.19***
(0.323)

0.332
(0.210)

0.372*
(0.201)

March

1.89***
(0.353)

1.42***
(0.311)

0.305*
(0.161)

0.236
(0.154)

April

1.49***
(0.348)

0.993***
(0.307)

0.0702
(0.140)

0.0554
(0.136)
(continued)
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Table 6A.1 (continued)
Fatalities
(Doppler,
no warning)a

Fatalities
(warning,
no Doppler)a

Injuries
(Doppler,
no warning)a

Injuries
(warning,
no Doppler)a

May

1.44***
(0.341)

1.12***
(0.298)

−0.408***
(0.129)

−0.473***
(0.125)

June

0.944*
(0.375)

0.506
(0.336)

−0.187
(0.132)

−0.226*
(0.129)

August

2.48***
(0.366)

2.07***
(0.323)

−0.161
(0.169)

−0.0645
(0.162)

September

1.68***
(0.420)

1.05***
(0.387)

−0.0892
(0.172)

−0.109
(0.168)

October

2.16***
(0.393)

1.60***
(0.357)

0.0360
(0.173)

0.0064
(0.169)

November

2.10***
(0.354)

1.70***
(0.313)

0.269*
(0.153)

0.317*
(0.150)

December

2.20***
(0.392)

1.74***
(0.355)

0.0023
(0.241)

0.0795
(0.234)

Density

0.000251
(0.000995)

0.0000
(0.0001)

0.0029***
(0.0007)

0.0003***
(0.0001)

Mobiles

3.67***
(0.660)

4.04***
(0.654)

2.79***
(0.529)

3.07***
(0.526)

Income

0.00865
(0.00915)

0.0118
(0.0091)

0.0077
(0.0083)

0.0159*
(0.0081)

Rural

−1.40***
(0.212)

−1.57***
(0.218)

−0.598***
(0.155)

−0.616***
(0.153)

Nonwhite

−0.898*
(0.367)

−1.03***
(0.363)

0.657*
(0.313)

0.593*
(0.306)

Male

2.42
(2.47)

2.17
(2.40)

−6.54***
(2.02)

−6.59***
(1.99)

Under 18

1.53
(1.81)

1.53
(1.74)

−5.19***
(1.37)

−5.83***
(1.34)

Over 65

−3.94*
(1.69)

−5.56***
(1.65)

−5.54***
(1.11)

−5.59***
(1.08)

Commute 30+ min.

2.19***
(0.413)

2.30***
(0.458)

0.361
(0.351)

0.0932
(0.381)

No high school

1.81*
(0.791)

1.45*
(0.786)

3.07***
(0.662)

3.63***
(0.646)
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Table 6A.1 (continued)
Fatalities
(Doppler,
no warning)a

Fatalities
(warning,
no Doppler)a

Injuries
(Doppler,
no warning)a

Injuries
(warning,
no Doppler)a

College

−0.244
(0.840)

−1.41*
(0.836)

−0.0540
(0.694)

−0.0097
(0.683)

Poverty rate

1.48
(1.16)

1.75
(1.27)

−2.43*
(1.03)

−2.06*
(1.01)

Length

0.1002***
(0.0214)

0.0008***
(0.0002)

0.347***
(0.0592)

0.0032***
(0.0006)

Length × density

0.0006
(0.0008)

0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0072***
(0.0020)

0.0001***
(0.0000)

F1

2.73***
(0.374)

−10.5***
(1.71)

F2

4.65***
(0.365)

4.17***
(0.101)

F3

6.30***
(0.364)

5.18***
(0.154)

F4

7.88***
(0.368)

6.54***
(0.255)

F5

10.19***
(0.387)

7.50***
(0.867)

Intercept

−10.5***
(1.83)

2.40***
(0.0810)

0.672
(1.30)

0.282
(1.35)

# observations

20,605

20,605

Log likelihood

−1,797

−9,400

NOTE: Fatality estimates use Poisson regression models and injuries use negative
binomial models with standard errors in parentheses. *significant at the 0.10 level
(two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
a
See Appendix 6A for the distinction in the two calculations of fatalities and injuries.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from SPC, NWS, and U.S. census data.
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